Post Arafat: Two Palestine Entities?

Barely two days after Yasser Arafat was buried, under the chaotic circumstances in his Ramallah Mukhata fortress, some forty gunmen, belonging to his loyal Al Aqsa Martyrs' brigades ( renamed after his death to Arafat's Martyr's brigades), rushed into a mourning tent in Gaza City, November 15, and opened fire on the congregation. Two men were killed and four badly wounded. Among the congregation was Mahmoud Abbas ( Abu Mazen), the man Fatah had just nominated to run for Palestinian president, they could easily have killed him and gunned down all the mourners packed in the tent. As it turned out he was unhurt.
Colonel Mohammed Dahlan had sought to place the Gaza-based Presidential guard, Force 17, in charge of overall security for the mourners' tent and the Palestinian dignitaries gathering there that evening. He was snubbed by the chiefs of all the local Gaza security, intelligence and terrorist groups, including Hamas, Jihad Islami and the Popular Resistance Committees, the umbrella for Gaza's al Aqsa Brigades. Each chief insisted on his personal bodyguards accompanying him into the tent, with no coordination among them. Moussa Arafat, for instance, is never seen without his 60-70 bodyguards; Gaza Strip general intelligence chief Mohammed Hindi employs between 40 and 50.
Notwithstanding these armies of protectors, a hostile band of gunmen managed to break into the tent, keep up a 10-minute barrage of automatic fire and make a clean getaway. Palestinian sources agree that this brazen demonstration of strength and clean escape could not have been carried off without the connivance of most of the faction chiefs present – which bodes ill for Abu Mazen's chances of gaining Gaza Strip support for his bid for the presidency.
Tension rose already during Arafat's funeral in Ramallah. Moussa Arafat, one of the dead leaders's closest relatives present, was visibly ignored by the Ramallah leadership. None of dignitaries approached him with condolences. Things became even more hectic next day, when Moussa Arafat was left out at the graveside of his uncle. This serious affront did not go unnoticed in Gaza and revenge was inevitable.
An investigation into the attack revealed that the perpetrators belonged to a group (led by leaders of the Gaza Branch of Fatah, among these, secretary Ahmed Hallas Abu Mazher) arch rival of Dahlan and Moussa Arafat's ally.
The message from the Gazaeans to the Ramallah was crystal clear: " No one can replace Arafat and look out, next time we shall shoot to kill, if you ignore us!"
Monday's high profile provocation was not the first in lawless Gaza.
A similar clash between Dahlan's men and Hallas' faction took place on January 1, Fatah's commemoration day, when hundreds of armed men participated in a show of strength in the Gaza stadium, only weeks after a similar event held by Hamas. When Dahlan's supporters took over the podium, the brawl ensued, with casualties on both sides.
Since the beginning of this year, these incidents have included mutual killings, the explosion of a booby-trapped car outside the headquarters of Moussa Arafat, an attack on Hallas by unknown assailants, and a series of kidnappings of Arafat supporters in the Gaza Strip.
Yasser Arafat had lent his complete backing to the camp headed by Hallas and by his cousin, Moussa Arafat, which had the upper hand during his lifetime. It is a camp that has many members from, or associated with, the Arafat family. Other members are from the "Fatah hawks" in Rafah. Now with Arafat's demise, it has lost considerable power.
Dahlan, on the other hand, controls the preventive security force, several other central groups in Fatah, and some of the other armed groups such as Amin al-Hindi's general intelligence service. According to sources in Gaza, the two camps are now of about equal strength.
Dahlan also has control of the revenues that come from the crossing points into the Gaza Strip, and undoubtedly can lay his hands on tens of millions of dollars that have been gathered over the years.

The Struggle for Arafat's Legacy

The Palestinian Authority (PA) has been disintegrating for months and virtually ceased functioning as a central control element. Although, following the recent election of Abu Mazen's determination has given a glimmer of hope for stabilisation in the territories, the newly elected president will face some highly precarious hurdles, in order to step into the shoes of the deceased Rai's- Arafat. One of those hurdles will be to establish some law and order in the chaotic gaza strip and especially in its southern sector, Khan Yunis and Rafah, in which even the dominating Rai's could not break the ruling local family clans. Rafah, with its strategic location and traditional smuggling routes, could become a break or make effort for any central control in the Gaza strip and it is highly doubtful, wether a man like Abu Mazen is up to this task.
Last spring, former US Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk reported that a state of semi-anarchy and gang rule was engulfing the West Bank and Gaza.
The glue that held the West Bank and Gaza strip together is now gone. The aftershocks of his demise are still pending, before nearly four million Palestinians will come to realize that a new era has started, with hopes and and expectations, but equally dangerous escalation and despair in the offing.
With no single leader or clear chain of command, it is going to be very hard for anyone to change Palestinian policy or take decisive action such as ending the violence or engaging in serious negotiations. A post-Arafat period anarchy, in which different groups, factions, local warlords, and security agencies operate on their own and ignore instructions from the top could be dangerous for all concerned. The Palestinian movement will split along a number of possible lines: between Palestinians inside ( local leadership, West Bank and Gaza ) and outside leaders in exile: like Khaled Mishal of Hamas in Damascus and Farouk Qadoumi of PLO in Tunis.
Furthermore, rivalries between factions in the West Bank and Gaza themselves will create local power bases in different towns, seeking self rule for personal interests.
Into such chaotic circumstances dangerous elements like Hezbollah, backed by Iran, or even Al Qaeda, will try to expand their influence, which could, if not curbed in time, reach strategic proportions in the region .
One outcome of this disintegration could be the breakup of the Palestinian self rule areas into two geographically distinct entities. This would not be all that surprising. Palestinian society, after all, has always been strongly characterized by tribalism, as well as strong regional differences that set apart hill dwellers from plainsmen, nomads from settled population, urbanites from villagers, and Easterners from Westerners. While the West Bank is only about thirty miles from Gaza, there is more separating the two territories than an expanse of the Israeli Negev Desert.
In the West Bank, only 27 percent of the population are refugees, as opposed to the 64 percent that inhabit the Gaza Strip. Residents of the two areas have for decades, developed a quiet, and sometimes not so quiet, animosity toward each other.
For one, the different regional patriarchal clans have always dominated local politics in the two territories. In the West Bank, the Nashishibi, Huseini, Ja'abari and Masri families are among the dominant political elite. By nature, these clans are regional, and are often at odds, since they compete for economic, political and social stature.
Khalil Shiqaqi, a prominent Palestinian sociologist, after conducting hundreds of interviews, notes the presence of "a psychological barrier between the inhabitants of the two territories and . . . mutual suspicion" that cannot be "disregarded or ignored."
Shiqaqi's study, entitled The West Bank and Gaza Strip: Future Political and Administrative Relations, shows the existence of a prevalent West Bank belief that the Gaza Strip is "nothing but a big refugee camp." Further, West Bankers see the Gaza Strip as a backward society with "increased crime, inclined to roughness, extremism, grimness, fanaticism and instability."
Gaza's stronger local families include the Shawwa, Shafei and Middein families. But they remain a clear minority but Gazans, for their part, expressed their misgivings over the patronizing and discriminating West Bankers, who show them little respect.
According to an Israeli internal security (Shin-Bet) report before the outbreak of the Intifada, those sentiments have generally gone unchanged. The report noted "mounting hostility and a growing rift between the West Bank and Gaza Strip," to the point that "senior officials in the West Bank are against opening the 'safe passage' route [between the West Bank and Gaza Strip according to the Oslo accord], as the result could be to flood Judea and Samaria with Gazans!
The notion of Palestinian regionalism is further reinforced by the varied Arabic dialects spoken throughout the territories. West Bank dialects are similar to the Jordanian dialect, while influences of Egyptian dialect are heard throughout Gaza.

Palestinian Territories Might Become Two Separate States

Geopolitics have long exacerbated Palestinian tribalism and limited ties between the West Bank and Gaza. After the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, Egypt occupied Gaza and Jordan occupied the West Bank. A pro-Egypt, pan-Arabist movement developed in Gaza, while many Palestinians in the West Bank developed an allegiance to the Hashemite Kingdom.
The West Bank was merged legally and administratively into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1950. Notwithstanding Israeli occupation of the territory since 1967, Jordan maintained its links with the West Bank until August 1988 when King Hussein declared the "dismantling of legal and administrative links" with the West Bank..Transjordanians tended to fear that the numerically preponderant Palestinians could emerge as a dominant force in Jordan itself ( an estimated over fifty percent of Jordan's population is of Palestinian origin!).
In the first months after the 1967 war, it was, strangely enough, the leadership of Nablus who were the first considered what they could do in order to begin negotiations between Israel and King Hussein of Jordan. They offered to act as mediators. They declared their wish to be returned to Jordan, even though they had suffered heavily under Jordanian rule. As is widely known, Jordan dealt very harshly with them because of their frequent uprisings against King Hussein in the West Bank in the 1950s and early 1960s. Those uprisings had endangered Hussein's regime, his rule and his crown, and the Jordanians subdued them with brutal force.
The Nablus leaders' offer to mediate was not accepted.
Recent insider reports have indicated that behind the scene, young King Abdullah II of Jordan has taken new interest in the West Bank and a possible revival of the shelved "Jordan Option" of the late eighties. According to Ehud Ya'ari, a leading Middle East expert, in closed forums, central figures from the Palestinian leadership have lately started talking about the need for Jordan to resume an active, substantive role in the West Bank. Sixteen years after the late King Hussein was forced to declare his kingdom's disengagement from its former possessions across the river amid the wrath of the first Intifada, there are whispers about the need to find a new formula establishing some kind of linkage between efforts to create an independent Palestinian state and the neighbour to the east.
However, even if the "Jordanian Option" should materialise, its efforts to re-establish some stability in the prevailing West Bank anarchy seems highly dubious.
Factually, the Palestine National Authority (PNA) can exercise control only over the 'greater Ramallah' region and even there it is not complete, as the dramatic scenes of Rafat's funeral demonstrated.
A major problem exists through the geographical non- linkage between northern Samaria ( Nablus-Jenin) and southern Judea ( Bethlehem and Hebron) will continue to pose critical interconnection problems for any central authority control, as long as the Jerusalem issue remains unresolved, which is blocking direct traffic routes between the two PNA enclaves.

Chaotic Situation in The West Bank Towns

Local warlords are the de-facto rulers of all major West Bank cities.
Three of those stand out in particular.
Jenin, in the north is virtually under control of the head of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Zacharia Zubeidi. In an interview published Mid November, Zubeidi told the Financial Times that he would accept Abbas as the Fatah candidate if he were freely elected, but said that his loyalty would only last for as long as he kept to the enduring Palestinian stance in negotiations.
The 28-year-old Zacharia Zubeidi is one of the highest-profile armed militants in the West Bank. He rose to local prominence in the battle that came after Israeli tanks rolled into the Jenin refugee camp in April 2002, and which left 52 Palestinians - including one of his five brothers - and 23 Israeli soldiers dead.
Young Zubeidi became famous, when in July 2003 he kidnapped the then governor of Jenin Heydar Irsheid, accusing him of corruption, torching the municipal offices and parading in the streets clutching Arafat's portrait.
Perhaps the most embarrassing incident which occured in Jenin happened on May 14, 2002 when Arafat made his first trip by helicopter to visit the ruins of Jenin refugee camp after the battle. While thousands of Palestinians were waiting below, countless TV crews awaiting his arrival, Arafat sudenly cancelled his landing , following strict warnings by his security men, that angered crowds in the camp could assault him. Ominously, a stage from which Mr Arafat was to address the crowd in Jenin refugee camp was mysteriously burnt shortly before he began his journey. What was planned as a triumphant return ended in dreadful calamity for which the people of Jenin never forgave their cherished leader.
Hebron is large terrorist center ruled by a prominent family clan.
In October 2003, more than 100 members of the Qawasma family and others were arrested in an attempt to put a stop to the activities of the cell, which have resulted in the deaths of over 80 Israelis. But the terror cell that dispatched Ahmed Qawasma and Nisim Jabri on the double suicide attack in Be'er Sheva, last September, was orchestrated by Imad Qawasma, head of the military wing of Hamas, Iz a-Din al-Qassam, in Hebron. Shortly afterwards, Imad Tsalah A-Fatah Qawasma, 31, surrendered after soldiers surrounded his home.
Until April 2002 Colonel ( later Brigadier General) Jibril Rajoub virtually exercised control over Hebron, but since Israel's destruction of his headquarters, his authority has waned deteriorating into total lawlessness in the clan-ruled city.
How independent Hebronites felt even during Arafat's rule can demonstrate an incident which happened last July.
As pro-reform Palestinian legislator Nabil Amer was nursing the wounds inflicted by Yasser Arafat's gunmen, a phone call came through to his room at the Amman university hospital from none other than Arafat. The Palestinian leader inquired about his health and offered to pay his hospital expenses.
Amer did not bother to reply.
Sitting beside his bed was a fellow Hebronite, Rafiq Natshe, once Palestinian legislative council speaker, for many years PLO ambassador in Saudi Arabia and a highly respected figure in the Palestinian community. Known also as Abu Shakar, he is the head of the leading Natshe family of Hebron. Since Amer belongs to the largest Mt Hebron clan, which is centered on the large village of Dura, Natshe's frequent hospital visits are ominously charged: the two great clans of the southern West Bank have decided to make common cause against Arafat. These people will not readily submit to a centralised Post Arafat rule from Ramallah!
An even worse situation of anarchy prevails in Nablus, the lagest West Bank town.
Nablus, the largest city in the northern West Bank, represents an extreme illustration of the anarchy which has taken hold in the Palestinian territories - a situation which, according to analysts, could well descend into civil war as veteran Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat finally departs the scene.
Struggles between different factions of Arafat's Fatah movement are thought to be behind the assassination last April of the Palestinian journalist Khalil al-Ziban, who also served as an advisor to Arafat, as well as a raft of other violent crimes in the territories.
The internecine warfare claimed its most high-profile casualty early May when the long-standing and respected mayor of the city, Ghassan al-Shaka, announced his resignation to President Arafat.
His intention was to "ring the alarm bell" urging the Palestinian Authority to implement draconian measures to put an end to the reign of terror of the armed groups.
While Shaka was reluctant to point the finger, many Palestinians lay the blame for the chaos in Nablus at the door of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, an armed offshoot of Fatah which appears commanded by Abu Mahmud, an outspoken critic of Shaka.
According to Hazem Zhokan, who heads the ruling Fatah party's branch in the Nablus refugee camp of Balata, the growing crime rate is a direct consequence of a bitter power struggle between former mayor, governor Mahmud al-Alul and the leaders of the various security services. PNA officials, who attempted to restore some degree of law and order in Nablus were chased out by local armed gangs at gunpoint.

The Gaza Connection: International Transitional Protectorate?

In view of the dangerous developments in the Post-Arafat era and a continued impasse in Israeli politics towards a common solution, analysts consider future international intervention imperative in order to prevent a dangerous Iranian-backed power base, especially in Gaza, once Ariel Sharon's disengagement initiative is realised in 2005.
Although Israel has vehemently opposed such a move, an international transitional protectorate vehicle for the West Bank and Gaza strip, formally replacing Israel's occupation authority ( and the disintegrating PNA) cannot be ruled out if the deadlock continues with its vicious circle of violence.
Within such a " protectorate" Jordan and Egypt would have to play an active part, each in their immediate sphere of influence and the help of Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, can become a crucial element in search for a viable solution.
Mohammed Dahlan, former security chief in Gaza, is carefully signaling readiness to consider its disengagement from the West Bank in what is named a Palestinian Transitional Administration (PTA).
Colonel Dahlan, won the largest number of votes in internal Fatah elections, last July, in the northern Gaza Strip which is significant and could undermine a central Palestinian Authority influence in Gaza. His meteoric rise from the son of a poor refugee family in Khan Yunis to one of the wealthiest Palestinians in the Gaza Strip has become legendary. Dahlan has many rivals and Monday's attack on the mourners tent, signalled that any bid of his for control in the strip would not remain unchallenged.
Working through emmissaries, Dahlan is said to be one of the proponents of an important document recently published called "A Proposal for Governance of the Gaza Strip in the Context of the Announced Israeli Withdrawal."
This document, also called "the Toledo Plan" is the result of workshops and deliberations held jointly by Israelis and Palestinians with the participation of experts from Canada, Ireland and Spain, under the auspices of the Madrid-based Toledo International Center for Peace. First published by the Haaretz on Friday November 19 it has already caused significant attention in Israel and Gaza.
The Israeli team included former senior personnel from the defense establishment and the Prime Minister's Office - Major General (res.) Ze'ev Livneh, who was the military aide to Benjamin Netanyahu when he was prime minister; Pini Meidan from the Mossad espionage agency and from the bureau of former prime minister Ehud Barak; Peri Golan from the Shin Bet security service; Motti Krispal from Ehud Barak's peace directorate; and Uri Ne'eman from the Mossad. Of the public figures, the best known is Shlomo Ben-Ami, who served as foreign minister in the Barak government; among the representatives of his party who took part in the discussions were MKs Matan Vilnai and Ophir Pines-Paz ( Labour), both have joined Ariel Shraon's new coalition in January 2005.
Heading the other side's team was Dr. Khaled al-Yazji, former chief of protocol in the Palestinian Authority, and with him three others identified themselves by name, with all the risks this entails: Basil Jibril, Amjad Atallah and Abdullah Sati. About three months ago, Al-Yazji was one of the few who dared to call on Yasser Arafat to resign, at long last, and to let the Palestinians get on with the peace process. His call reflected the frame of mind of Dahlan during one of the peaks of his disputes with Arafat.
The central aim of the Toledo plan is "to facilitate the development of a reliable Palestinian structure of governance that would create the conditions for a peaceful and successful execution of the withdrawal plan." That structure is meant to take the form of a temporary Palestinian Authority for Gaza, known as the Palestinian Transitional Administration (PTA). Under the Toledo Plan, a reliable governing body in Gaza should be endorsed by a special United Nations Security Council resolution; in the same resolution the Security Council should also reiterate its recognition of the two-sovereign state principle. (For details see: www.toledopeace.org)
Wether anyone will be strong enough to control the crucial Rafah region, however remains highly questionable. The dominant family clans and their lucrative smuggling activities will hardly give in to any authority without a fight.

Outlook

Experienced Mid-East analysts estimate that there is little chance that liberal democracy will succeed in the Palestinian Authority. Not now. Not for a long time.
In the best-case scenario, temporary Palestinian leadership and future leadership will be mired in powerlessness. Before anything positive can happen the winners in this election will have to break the logjam of the Arafat legacy, a legacy that demanded that the Palestinian people fight for everything and compromise on nothing. A legacy that most hold dear.
Finally, there is the problem of Hamas, whose power has grown significantly since 2000. Hamas has signaled its readiness to join the new Palestinian leadership on the basis of equality, but that would mean veto power over major political decisions, particularly those related to the conflict with Israel. At the same time, Hamas spokesmen have hinted that while the movement accepted Arafat's personal status as leader, it might challenge the current leadership in the coming election. Given Fatah's ongoing disintegration, Hamas could emerge as the most powerful organization, at least in the Gaza Strip, even though its current leaders lack the stature and charisma of former leaders Ahmad Yasin and Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, killed by Israel in March 2004. Thus, while Arafat only sought to co-opt Hamas, the new leaders may be forced to accept it as a partner in government, thereby ending Fatah's monopoly of power in Palestinian politics.
Mahmoud Abbas and Ahmed Qurei lack any power base among the grassroots activists or "Tanzim" (organization) leaders of the "interim generation" who led the 1987-1993 intifada and have served as the backbone of Fatah ever since. Under Arafat, these Tanzim activists were relegated to secondary positions in the PA institutions; the front ranks were reserved for the "Tunisians."
The most prominent of these is Marwan Barghouti, former Secretary-General of Fatah in the West Bank, who is now serving five life terms in an Israeli prison for the murder of Israeli civilians. Unlike the Tunis-based leaders, he enjoys widespread popularity for his incorruptibility and defiance of Israel.
Indications of the potential challenge of the Tanzim leaders may be found in the news spread by his supporters that Barghouti would run in the elections for PA chairman, scheduled for January 2005.
But no matter who takes the reigns, the chance of a West Bank-Gaza Strip split is very real. Despite a recent flood of books and articles attesting to long-standing patriotism, the Palestinian Arab community has a longer tradition of factionalism and disunity. Indeed, it was tribalism and clan rivalries that rendered the Palestinian nationalist movement ineffectual against the Zionist movement during the first half of the 20th century.
Incidentally, this notion of separation is not without precedent. In 1948, after the withdrawal of the British, Bangladesh and Pakistan became two separate, culturally distinct territories under a single rule. For more than two decades, Bangladeshis grumbled about their role as junior partner in this unlikely marriage.
Then, in 1971, with a deepened sense of nationalism that could no longer be denied, Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan after 23 years.
However in the Middle East, clocks go differently and by the end of the day decisions will inevitably be made, neither in Jerusalem, nor Ramallah, but as usual since 2001, in Washington.

Iran's Long-Range Missile Program: Nato's Next Challenge

Introduction
The post-Cold War era has been marked by new concern over an escalated
arms race, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the evolving role of state and non-state actors in the acquisition, spread, and employment of WMD. Long range Ballistic missile threats will increase the vulnerability of European population centres. This has already produced substantial changes in strategic perceptions of the Mediterranean countries. The southern flank of the Alliance – from Portugal to Turkey – would be especially vulnerable to attack by medium and long-range missiles emanating from so-called 'rogue' countries. The most serious threat is faced by Turkey, which is fully exposed to air and missile risks from Iran. In responding to this perceived threat, Allied leaders decided, after 1994, to step up NATO´s drive against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Two groups have been established to study the issues involved: one that focuses on the political and preventive aspects of NATO´s approach to dealing with proliferation (Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation); and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation, which is responsible for considering how NATO´s defence posture can support its non-proliferation efforts and provide protection to the organisation´s members should the latter fail. However, sofar little has been done effectively to curb the threat.
WMD topped missiles are likely to be used against deployed NATO forces involved in regional contingencies, like UN-mandated peace-keeping, peace-making or peace-enforcement, the military enforcement of trade sanctions, and embargoes.
Overall, the Alliance has reasons to be worried about the strategic consequences for its members of the proliferation of WMD.
A foremost dangerous element in WMD and missile proliferation is the Islamic Republic of Iran (Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran ). Iran's missile and possibly, its WMD program, has passed the point of no return. The Iranians cannot be stopped anymore. They have their indigenous capability now and they will continue with their programs regardless of what the international community thinks. Iran will continue to develop missiles because their missile industry has nothing to do with the degree of radicalism of the regime. For Iran it is a matter of pride. Iran's missile program has become a national program that will be unaffected by any regime change.
Iran's Ambitious Missile Program
Iran is rapidly attaining self-sufficiency in missile production and deployment. It is currently pursuing an ambitious missile program that, coupled with its nuclear aspirations, is perceived as a growing threat.
Israeli and U.S. intelligence sources have reported that Iran is actively trying to develop the Shahab-4 missile, which is thought to have a range of 2,000 kilometers and a warhead of around 1,000 kilograms. The Iranian Defense Minister admitted in February 1999 that Iran was in the process of constructing the Shahab-4 missile, but said it was for launching a satellite into space. However, its range would bring far-away targets such as Germany and western China within Iran's reach.
Currently, the bulk of Iran's ballistic missile inventory still consists mainly of North Korean-supplied Scud Bs that have a 320km range (200 miles) and Scud Cs with a 550km range (340 miles).
Reliable intelligence reports indicate that China has supplied Iran with more than 200 160km-range (100 miles) CSS-8 tactical ballistic missiles. However the pattern of Iran's missile technology acquisitions since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 suggests that its ultimate goal is the establishment of an autonomous tactical ballistic missile (TBM) manufacturing capability. Chinese and North Korean assistance has given Iran the capability to assemble complete Scud B and Scud C TBMs from knock-down kits imported from North Korea. Iran also may have been following the Iraqi model by attempting to increase further the range of its Scud Bs and Cs through modifications. However, North Korea remains Iran's key missile technology supplier.
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The Iranian Missile Production Infrastructure
The main design center is reported to be located at the Defense Technology and Science Research Center, which is a branch of Iran's Defense Industry Organization, and located outside Karaj — near Tehran. This center directs a number of other research efforts. Some experts believe it has support from Russian and Chinese scientists. Intelligence satellite images revealed concrete underground shelters and tunnels in Iranian coastal areas which could be used to store Scud and other missiles in hardened sites reducing their vulnerability to air, or missile attack.
North Korean-built plants at Isfahan and Sirjan can produce liquid fuels and structural components, while a Chinese-built production facility near Semnan is the centre of Iran's efforts to develop and produce the Mushak-series of TBMs with ranges between 120 and 200km (75-125 miles).
Another facility was sighted near Bandar Abbas probably assembling of the Chinese Seersucker. China is said to have built this facility in 1987, and is believed to be helping the naval branch of the Guards to modify the PRC Seersucker ( HY-2 [Hongying / Hai Ying] coast-to-ship defensive tactical missile weapon system to extend its range to 400 kilometers.
Iran's main missile test range is said to be further east, near Shahroud, along the Tehran-Mashhad railway. A telemetry station is supposed to be 350 kilometers to the south at Taba, along the Mashhad-Isfahan road. All of these facilities are reportedly under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
Updated Iranian Missile Potential 2004
While efforts continue to field longer range ballistic missiles, the Soviet-designed Scud-B ( Shahab-1 'Meteor' ) guided missile currently forms the core of Iran's ballistic missile forces. The Scud-B is a relatively old Soviet design (the R-17E or R-300E) that first became operational in 1967, and has a range of 290-300 kilometers with its normal conventional payload. Its main mission is defensive, against near regional threats.
The Scud-B comes with a conventional high-explosive warhead weighing about 1,000 kilograms, of which 800 kilograms are the high-explosive payload and 200 kilograms are the warhead structure and fusing system. It has a single-stage, storable, liquid-rocket engine and is usually deployed on the MAZ-543 eight wheel transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). It has a strap-down inertial guidance which uses three gyros to correct its ballistic trajectory, and has internal graphite jet-vane steering. The warhead hits at a velocity above Mach 1.5, with Circular Error Probability (CEP) 450m rad.
A longer range version, Scud-C ( Shahab-2) reportedly co-designed by North Korea and PRC, known as Hwasong 6. With a range between 500-700km warhead about 700kg, but its 50m CEP renders more accuracy.
Experts estimate that Iran could possibly modify the warhead to increase the payload at the expense of range for more lethal agents such as persistent nerve gas.
The Shahab-3 ( aka Zelzal-3 comes from a verse in the Koran meaning "resurrection day earthquake.") is reportedly a derivative of the North Korean NoDong-1 single stage liquid fueled 1000-1350km range missile. Its approx 1000kg warhead impacts within 190m CEP (improved version ?) at yet unspecified (but seemingly higher) Mach velocity).
On 20 October 2004 Iran conducted a test of the Shahab-3. Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani said the Defense Ministry has upgraded the former version of Shahab 3 guided missiles and test fired it in the military exercise called `defense shield exercise`.
Israeli missile experts having access to intelligence photos of the latest ( October 2004) Shahab-3 test, estimate that improvements on the warhead could permit slower entry into the atmosphere, which are necessary for chemical payloads. It appears that the missile was fired from a different launch vehicle and that the traditional cone-shaped warhead, used in previous tests, was replaced by a new one, flatter type, fitted with short 'canard' type winglets, which could indicate search for higher accuracy on CEP impact.
Israeli and U.S. intelligence sources have reported that Iran is actively trying to develop the Shahab-4 missile, which is thought to have a range of 2,000 kilometers and a warhead of around 1,000 kilograms. According to some analysts, the Iranian Shahab-4 missile is believed to be a derivative of the 1,500-kilometer range North Korean NoDong-2 (ND-2), an extensive redesign of the Scud technology.
However, other reports claim that the missile is based on the Soviet SS-4 Sandal
missile and is entirely a product of Russian missile technology. According to expert estimates, the missile could use two booster stages equipped with the No Dong engines, or a single No Dong engine on top of a more powerful Russian-designed motor. Israeli sources have claimed that Russia has been providing Iran technology from the SS-4 program.
Quoting from the Oct. 1, 1998, The Washington Times, "Israeli, Prime Minister Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu said, "Iran is developing the Shahab-4 which can reach well into Europe, and the Shahab-5 (and 6?) which (will have the capacity) to reach the Eastern Sea board (of the United States)". The article went on to quote from the Blue-ribbon Congressional commission, headed by then former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. There are indications that the Iranians adopted the North Korean intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), Taep'o-dong-2 (TD-2) technology, which is said to be a two or three stage missile, its third stage including a solid fuel motor and warhead, with a 700-1,000 kg payload, estimated at approximately 3,650-3,750 km range. Israeli intelligence name the Shahab-5 Kosar ( 'Stream of eternal life in paradise' in Farsi). Its launch vehicle also known as the Shahab-5 (and 6), was suggested to be the Iranian variant of the North Korea's Taep'o-dong-2 booster.
On February 9, 2000, The Washington Times, disclosed the following information,. "North Korea recently sold Iran a dozen medium range ballistic missile engines"---- (in November 1999). The engines arrived in Iran on Nov. 21, (1999) after they were spotted being loaded aboard an Iran Air Boeing 747 cargo jet that left Suinan International Airfield about 12 miles north of-----Pyongyang (North Korea)".
On June 2, 2004, the Iranian Defense Ministry announced that it was producing Iran's first stealth cruise missile, also called Kosar, which would be capable of hitting ships and aircraft.
Iran may have even more ambitious aims in store. Some sources claim that the Russians are helping a solid-fuel design team at the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group in Tehran develop a 4,500 kilometer missile, capable of reaching London and Paris, and a 10,000 kilometer range missile that could strike cities in the eastern United States. While these objectives seem still far fetched, they might well indicate where Teheran's aspirations lay!
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European Ballistic Missile Defence Plans
The reluctance of America's European allies to support and pursue their own national missile defense was traditionally the result of a strategic calculation: that most European states are unlikely to wage war against the emerging ballistic missile powers, including Iran, Iraq and North Korea. Whereas the U.S. feared that its security commitments, coupled with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, would make it an attractive target to would-be aggressors, Europe's strategic situation rationally argued against investing in National Missile Defence (NMD), like the USA and Israel.
Europe is involved in ballistic missile defense, but at the theater level. The Netherlands and Germany, for example, have decided to buy the "PAC-3," a newer version of the Patriot theater missile defense system, while Germany's DaimlerChrysler Aerospace and Italy's Alenia take part in a Lockheed Martin-led consortium to build the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) to counter short-range ballistic missile threats. In 2001, NATO awarded contracts to multinational teams to design a full-spectrum TMD system using both American and European defence companies. This, and other TMD activity, shows that Europe is not categorically opposed to ballistic missile defense, but interest in such systems does not translate into support for a full-fledged NMD. These TMD systems, designed to cover the "lower-tier" of a layered air and theater missile defense, are capable only of shielding relatively small areas from short-range missiles. At this time, Europe has no plans to pursue national missile defense systems that could counter long-range ballistic missiles of the kind that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq are expected to wield soon.
There were other trends in the mid-nineties, though.
On October 23, 1996, the UK Secretary of State for Defence, the Rt. Hon. Michael Portillo, presented, in his speech to the Belgian Royal Institute of International Affairs, the strongest case made to date by a senior British minister for the deployment of defences against ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), that are defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons.
Mr. Portillo's speech was a significant indication of the evolution of British policy on the threats posed by WMD and ballistic missiles and the need to counter them.
Studies were ordered to assess scenarios involving missile threats to British forces deployed abroad, to British sovereign territory and to the British Isles, and to examine the feasibility of a range of possible responses that might be adopted to defend against these threats.
The increasing official UK concern with these threats was also reflected by unusually blunt public statements by Admiral Sir Peter Abbott, UK Commander-in Chief, Fleet, then NATO's Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic.
If NATO's future -- as many of its observers suggest -- is in conducting large-scale "out-of-area operations," then a European belief that it is immune from war with Iran and North Korea does not bode well for the alliance. If Europe resigns itself psychologically to peacekeeping missions and other low-intensity conflicts, a division of labour could develop whereby the United States alone is responsible for, and capable of responding to, major out-of-area contingencies.
A Transatlantic Approach to the Threat
In August 2004, Washington watched with skepticism as European diplomats again tried to deter Iran's nuclear ambitions. On both sides of the Atlantic, there is agreement that a nuclear armed Iran would be a disaster for the region and possibly a last gasp for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). However, American and European politicians have little in common to resolve this dangerous threat. A coordinated transatlantic strategy for ending Iran's quest for nuclear weapons and their delivery platforms should become first priority on a common transatlantic political agenda. But meanwhile Europe has to take an active part in preparing for defence against WMD- armed ballistic missiles and with Iran, investing its national resources to achieve long range missiles capability, time is running out for Europe and NATO.
Europe's long standing attitude of self delution against an approaching threat must finally end in a more active confrontation to the problem. European capitals need to move beyond the economic self interest that motivates their Iran policies and take a tougher line on a range of issues, from Tehran's support of terrorism to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Europe and Nato can no longer afford continue to sit on the fence and wait for others to do their job.
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National Missile Defence Programs
In January 2002, the US Secretary of Defense created the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and consolidated the ballistic missile defence programs under the new agency. The rationale behind this decision was the creation of a comprehensive, integrated Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (MBDS) that provides a layered defence capable of countering threat missiles in all phases of flight.
Lethality has long been defined at intercept. Kill criteria have been based on destroying the lethal payload, dismembering the warhead or rendering the payload inert, or damaging the aeroshell sufficiently to prevent the threat missile from hitting its intended target.The planned GMD 2004 Test Bed program expected to accomplish some of these objectives. According to latest updates, US missile defence should near combat-ready status by the end of 2004. The DoD Missile Defense Agency, is conducting a series of battle management trials, in which portions of the system will be tested. The US Navy could deploy its destroyer based Aegis system in the Sea of Japan providing forward surveillance and tracking of North Korean missiles. A similar option will be placed in the Persian Gulf region.
The land based portion of BMDS is planned in silos at Vandenberg AFB, California by end 2004.
The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is a mobile ground-based missile defense element designed to protect forward-deployed military forces, population centers, and civilian assets from Short and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile attacks. THAAD is intended to intercept incoming ballistic missile using kinetic engery "hit-to-kill" technology. The THAAD system us intended to be capable of intercepting missiles at either high endoatmospheric or exoatmospheric altitudes. THAAD plans to provide an upper-tier missile layer of defense complimenting the lower-tier PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).
The Airborne Laser (ABL) is intended to shoot down enemy ballistic missiles during their boost phase. The ABL engagement concept is to place laser energy on the threat missile booster motor casing, rupturing or damaging it sufficiently to cause the missile to lose thrust or flight control and fall short of its intended target. The ABL engagement of ballistic missiles in the boost phase is intended to negate the missile before decoys, warheads, or submunitions are deployed.
Currently three Block configurations are planned: Blocks 2004, 2006, and 2008. Blocks 2004 and 2008 are on Boeing 747 transport aircraft modified to accomodate ABL systems. Block 2006 consists of hardware and software updates and continued testing of the 2004 weapon system. Block 2008 will also include the "Iron Bird," a ground test facility constructed inside the hull of a 747.
The ABL Block 2004 test program has significantly improved in the last year due to extension of the testing schedule, resulting in a more realistic plan. The primary goal for Block 2004 is to demonstrate an ability to defeat a threat ballistic missile using an airborne laser.
The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) replaces the current Defense Support Program (DSP). SBIRS improves support to theater Commander in Chiefs
(CINC's), U.S. deployed forces, and allies, by providing better data quality and timliness in four mission areas: Missile Warning, Missile Defense, Technical Intelligence, and Battlespace Characterization.
The Israeli IAI/Arrow was, from its very beginning, conceived and engineered to become a unique anti-ballistic missile system. It was designed in the aftermath of the 1990-1 Gulf War, and so was able to incorporate the lessons learned from the Patriot's failure.
The heart of the Arrow's envelope is its ability to intercept Al-Hussein type, or
Scud-C missiles within a range of between 550 and 650 kilometers and the IAI/ Elta Green Pine Radar's 500km range is a significant improvement over the Patriot system, allowing for improved data collection tracking incoming missile flight path calculation with several more minutes to prepare for intercept.
Additionally, the Arrow was designed to overcome the problem of Scuds disintegrating by aiming to intercept them earlier in their flight before they begin breaking apart.
But what seems still a problem for the Arrow, however, is the threat from the Iranian Shahab-3, a missile that travels three to four times faster than the Scud.
Another problem for BMD in general, is to overcome potential countermeasures, such as missiles using cooling off warheads, electronic radar jamming, decoys and rapidly maneuvring warheads after re-entry.
While as of today there is no evidence that any of the 'rogue' countries has employed these countermeasures, Iran, North Korea, and Syria are suspected of developing a fragmentation or cluster warhead, which would give single missiles the possibility of overwhelming the present BMD capabilities.
A solution could present Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) , or its derivatives.
The Israel Boost Intercept System (IBIS) and Missile Optimised Anti-Ballistic (MOAB) system is an active defence system capable of autonomously detecting and intercepting ballistic missiles in the boost phase. It was initiated in the late nineties, but is still on hold due to lack of funding.
Although technically regarded feasible, the system is based on four elements: high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV); small, lightweight agile interceptor missiles (kill vehicles); passive electro-optical sensors; and communications links.
The Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) Harpy drone, currently designed for air defence suppression, is based on UAV technologies that could mature in modified form for BPI systems. The same would apply to the emerging technologies now gaining momentum in developing unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV). To enhance the long-endurance loitering, mid-air refuelling from other aerial vehicles could also become feasible.
However there are identified shortcomings. Should a hostile nation prepare to simultaneously fire large missile salvoes from mobile launch platforms this could saturate any BPI attack.
Aware of these limitations, Israel's defence establishment has recently embarked upon a new anti-missile concept that envisages a new method of attacking and destroying the missile launchers (rather than the missile) once launched. This is a key difference, and a rather ambitious project that could have substantial benefits if successfully implemented. Designated 'Before Launch Phase Intercept' (BLPI), the system would require an advanced combination of on-location intelligence by satellite, air surveillance and possibly ground observation by special forces to detect, identify, warn and then point the aerial platform UAV to launch its kinetic kill vehicles (KKV) at the target - the missile launcher Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL). Further developments in space satellites and advanced air-to-air missiles could present interesting solutions in this field.

Egyptian Military Buildup- a Threat to Israel?
A dispute-ridden public debate has currently intensified, due to the recent events, over Egypt's intentions toward Israel, should the Palestinian conflict escalate into a regional warlike situation.
Some of the rightwing hardliners in Israeli politics and academic sources, have taken a firmer view than the defence establishment, which still maintains its traditional assessment, that Egypt does not, in the forseen future, pursue a warpath against Israel again.
Foremost in their negative approach towards Egypt are rightwing ministers like Avigdor Lieberman and Uzi Landau and Knesset member Dr Yuval Steinitz, chairman of the Knesset subcommittee for Defence Strategy and IDF Buildup. But Israel is not alone in its rather pessimistic outlook on Israel-Egyptian military relations. The debate has also reverberated in the corridors of the pre-September 11 Pentagon and US State Department. there the main focus concentrated over the future issue pertaining to the continued supply of sophisticated arms deliveries to Egypt and the preservation of Israel's so-called " quality edge" in a stable Middle East, if such could be maintained under the ongoing peace process crisis.
The following article concerns itself with an assessment of Egypt's military power, its warfighting capabilities and the realistic prospects of an escalation in the ongoing conflict situation, which could endanger the present stability of "moderate" Arab nations, including Egypt and draw them into a regional war against Israel.
The Egyptian Military Build-Up: Why So Much?
In order to be able to assess the combat value of the Egyptian armed forces in the present decade, it is necessary to review the developments, which have occured in the modernisation process since the peace agreement with Israel some twenty years ago.
First and foremost, there is wide discrepancy in the real defence spending volume over the past decade alone. Here there is conflicting information available, which has to be examined carefully.
The US Central Intelligence Agency estimate is that Egypt's defence spending in the 90s, was US$ 3,2 billion anually average.( about 8,2% of the national budget). Major Shawn Pine, a US specialist in counter intelligence claims, in an in-depth study published by the rightwing oriented Ariel Center for Policy Research( ACPR), that Egypt's real defence expenditure reached closer to US$ 20 billion.
Leading Israeli academic sources, which doubt Pine's estimates, do however agree, that the defence budget has increased during the last decade and could be around US$ 7-8 billion annually.
Dr Steinitz, estimates a 15-20% increase of defence expeditures due to Egypt's growing concern over regional instability.
Since the signing of the mutual peace agreement between Israel and Egypt in March 1979, the United States has supplied Egypt with military equipment and advanced weapons systems in value of over US$ 38 billion. Like Israel, Egypt receives annual grants totalling US$ 2, which iclude US$ 1,3 billion in military assistance, the second largest in US foreign aid sofar. But this is only part of the aid that Egypt benefits from its peace agreement with the Jewish State. Thanks to its, even minor, contribution to the US led coalition against Saddam Hussein in 1991, the US has erased some US$ 7,1 billion in outstanding debts, as well granting supply of surplus weapons systems, which have substantially helped to speed up the urgent modernisation process of Egypt's armed forces following the 1973 war.
A radical transformation of Egypt's armed forces has taken place and reflects substantial changes in its infrastructure. Since 1973, the Egyptian order of battle ( ORBAT) has increased, both quantitative and qualitative. From ten divisions, of which only half were armoured or mechanised, the present ground forces have 12 divisions, all but one are armoured and mechanised. Even more significant is their equipment. After the 1991 Gulf War, Egypt, with US assistance established its "Factory 200" project, an ambitious undertaking, which is assembling ( partly producing) the US General Dynamics Land System M1A1 Abrams MBT. In addition to the 555 tanks of this type already in service with the Egyptian armoured corps, further 200 or more will become available by 2007, providing at least two, if not three armoured divisions, a critical mass for an offensive oriented strategy.
In all, an estimated 7-% of the entire armoured arsenal is currently equipped with western type tanks. Of the 1700 M60A1, 835 have already been upgraded to M60A3 configuration, as have been part of the remaining 580 ex-Soviet supplied T-62, which remain servicable, in second line units.
The US has recently supplied two regiments with the 227mm MLRS artillery rockets, which will enhance, the sofar relatively neglected mobile support for offensive operations.
The modernisation of the mechanised divisions is also proceeding as planned. With some 2000 US M-113, about half of the total number of APCs already in service, further modernisation will include 611 Dutch YPR-765 armoured infantry vehicles to replace the aging Russian BMPs.
Having embarked on a myriad of five year acquisition and modernisation plans, the Egyptian airforce has, and still maintains the highest funding priorities. By reaching some 220 first line F-16 fighters, of block 40 configuration, which includes advanced technology transfer from the US, the EAF is nearing western standards, at least in the qualitative field. Although of its 500 combat aircraft inventory, roughly half is of advanced western standards, further deliveries under the Peace Vector program further advanced technology are anticipated. Currently, eight of the 21 fighter squadrons are equipped with F-16 carrying GBU-15 glide bombs and smart weapons such as the AFM-84 Harpoon.
Air-to-air combat capabilities include the purchase of 271 AIM-7M Sparrow and 314 AIM-9M Sidewinder missiles supplementing the extensive arsenal of AGM-65A/B/D Maverick, Exocet AM-39 and Rockeye missiles.
36 advanced AH-64A Apache attack helicopters, all of which could be upgraded to D model equipped with the Longbow radar will enhance offensive capabilities in anti-tank support, which is already including 540 Tow-2 launchers and 1000 Hellfire-2 laser guided ATGW.
Despite its emphasis on offensive airpower, Egypt remains committed to enhancing its air defence but retaining its independent Air Defence Command, a relic from the ex-soviet doctrine.
With some 80,000 men, organised into five divisions these forces include apart from the aging 90 batteries of SA2/3/6 SAM ( to be upgraded), 12 batteries each of I-Hawk ( to be modified to Phase III PIP standard), Chapparal and Crotale, as well as fixed AAA sites. More important additions are one Patriot PAC-3 battery ( 2 more on option) and 50 vehicle mounted FIM-92A Stinger Avengers which could enhance mobile air defence support. The Egyptian navy has long been the achilles heal of Egypts armed forces, but this has changed substantially over the last decade, with a significant restructuring and modernisation process.
Apart from including some highly effective surface and underwater capability, the navy has gained marked advantage by purchasing American supplied state-of-the-art weapons and detection systems, including underwater-to-surface Harpoon missiles, which pose considerable concern to Israeli naval commanders. According to Dr Steinitz the Egyptian naval modernisation is one of Israel's most serious concern, as it marked a distinctive strategic shift from the sofar protective inshore combat doctrine and the current move to an open sea capability, which could endanger Israel's strategic lifelines. As for non-conventional weapons, Egypt has stockpiled large quantities of various chemical weapons. Israeli intelligence reports indicate the expansion of the large Abu Zabaal chemical production plant near Cairo. Although CW are more or less "standard" issue weapons, Egypt has sofar not been as active in this field as other Arab armies in the region, but this could change, if, for example, biological warfare will become a future threat.
Israeli and US intelligence sources have recently become concerned with Egyptian activity to obtain access to the North Korean ballistic missile technology, and especially a 1100km range No-Dong class missile. US legislators have repeatedly requested information on such projects from Assistant Secretary of State William Burns, as to what purpose such offensive oriented acquisitions could serve in Egypt's defence.
Testing Egypt's Intentions.
The Egyptian Embassy in Tel Aviv, held its traditional Independence celebrations in a suburban beachfront hotel. Replacing the absent ambassador Bassiouni, who was recalled several years ago, was his deputy the current charge d'affaires Ihab Sharif. " What will happen if Egypt is drawn into another war with Israel by an escalating conflict with the Palestinians?" he was asked. Sharif's response to the challenge was firm: " Don't even think about that possibility. We are a peaceful people, we do not want to speak about war". Sharif's reply was quoted in the Egyptian press.
Similar comments were made by Egyptian foreign minister Ahmed Maher, and President Hosny Mubarak has repeatedly made it clear, that " war resolves nothing it only brings misery and death".
However Egyptian Defence Minister Field Marshal Mohammed Tantawi was more outspoken when he addressed his troops: " Should a situation develop under which Egypt will have to revert to force against Israel, Egypt is ready and its army stronger that in 1973". Senior aides to President Mubarak have threatened military response if Israel attacks Palestinian authority targets, according to The Middle East newsletter. Most analysts in Israel, believe however, that these statements are for internal consumption and that a warlike confrontation with Egypt, under Mubarak's regime is most unlikely.
According to the latest edition of the Middle East Military Balance 2000-2001 published by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv, tension between Egypt and Israel seems to result from the manner in which the two countries perceive one another as powerful players in the Middle Eastern arena. Egypt being the largest of Arab states, and Israel being the most technologically advanced country in the region make the two natural rivals. Israel remains concerned over Egypt's military build-up, which in the absence of potential threats can provide only justification against Israel's military superiority, which Egypt perceives as threat to its own regional hegemony. But the mainstream of Israel's defence community, continues, in spite of the fierce rethoric and media against Israel, to regard Egypt's intentions adhering to the peace agreement, at least in its military sphere.
Those who defend this view, consider the many benefits that Egypt has reaped from its peace with Israel as the main reasons for a continued strategic trend in Egypts defence policy. But this view is only one side of the coin.
In Egypt, beneath the thin strata that supports peace with Israel, most of Egypt's society is opposed to peace on the ground of national and religious issues. Thus the negative attitude reflected in the Egyptian media, could, under changing political conditions, affect the overall strategic outlook from the Nile. At the extreme spectrum of Egypt's society, which cannot be underestimated, remains the bastion of anti-Israeli sentiment. Should the political arena in the Middle East shift to radicalism, then Egypt may not remain spared of dangerous political changes and the peace with Israel will be the first to suffer a deadly blow.
Sofar the United States has claimed that that the massive arms deals with Egypt have been intended for defence or deterrence. It also made it clear that sharing information with Israel over military aid to Egypt, which is at peace is, not directly in America's interest. This position, along with recent developments in US global strategy in the middle east, has caused concern in Israel over the growing strategic importance of Egypt vis-a-vis Israel's traditional stance to the United States. Egypt's special position as a moderate leader in the Arab world, could, in Israel's view, substantially enhance its strategic weight in the ongoing anti-terror campaign waged by the Bush administration.
Former Defence Minister Ben Eliezer, rejects such a concern. Although he is visibly worried by Egypt's rapid military build-up in its offensive capability, this has yet to ripen into a realistic threat. Ascribing considerable importance to mutual military relations, as both nations face threats by fundamental terrorist elements, Ben-Eliezer mentioned the recent secret visit by Egypt's intelligence chief Omar Suleiman to Israel. Suleiman, 63, who is considered a possible candidate to succeed Mubarak met with leading Israeli officials to discuss mutually important issues, including counter terror activities.
But there are some deep seated strategic issues, which are in the core of Egypt's national aspirations and which have remained suppressed during the last decades.
According to retired Colonel Yoash -Chatto Zidon, a former rightwing Knesset member, who had served as chief of planning and operational requirements in the air force, " the most probable course of events will be the maintaining of Egypt of its option of joining a pan-Arab coalition to do away with Israel. It maintains its claims for the Southern Negev, Israel's highly strategic asset, as a land bridge that should join Africa with Asian Arabia under Egyptian domination". This rather far-fetched assessment is not shared by most of the Israeli defence establishment, but has been for many years, since the 1948 war, a widely discussed topic, on Egypt's strategic intentions, by leading academic oriental researchers.
Zidon substantiates his claim on secret Egyptian documents, captured during the 1967 Six Day War, in which the late president Gamal Abdul Nasser formally set these objectives as basis for the capture of the southern Negev. Wether Egypt will maintain its strained, but sofar intact peace or opt for war would depend on the following factors:
- wide ranging developments in the present US led anti-terror campaign, leading to serious destabilisations in the Arab world and the forming of a strong anti-western alliance between Syria-Iraq or Iran that overthrows the Hashemite Kingdom in support of an escalating conflict between Israel and Palestine.
- an Islamic fundamentalist takeover from the present secular regime in Egypt
- the new regime declaring the peace agreement null and void and preparing for an all out Jihad, in which Egypt under a radical regime would take a leading position.
- exploiting international support for the Arab cause, as an extreme rightwing regime in Israel loses its traditional political support from the United States.
One or more of these somber developments cannot be considered unrealistic in view of the present global situation.
Some concern in Israel is the fact, that the Egyptian armed forces have stepped up their offensive oriented exercices during 2001. In a massive show of force, which had no equal since the preparations for the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Egyptian Third Army held an extensive maneuver, the operational scenario of which was in the Sinai Peninsula. Israeli intelligence, is closely monitoring those movements in an increased alert status, but sofar has not taken any precautionary action, regarding those exercises as routine.
An Islamic Upheaval in Egypt- a Dangerous Path to War with Israel
As long as President Hosny Mubarak remains in power, a warlike contingency seems not only unrealistic, but also, by all counts illogical from Egypt's national interest viewpoint.
But all this can change, abruptly, once, for various reasons, an Islamic fundamentalist upheaval overthrows the secular regime and declares the peace process null and void.
One of the reasons for such a development could be the death of president Mubarak, or a military coup after a massive disruption of Egypt's officer corps, of the kind which crippled the Iranian armed forces after the fall of the Shah. The catastrophic results of a domino effect from an overthrow of General Pervez Musharaf by Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan, followed by Indonesia, could have devastating results inflicting on regional politics in the Middle East. With such huge arsenals of modern high lethal weapons massed in this already turbulent area, anything could happen when radical extremist elements take over.
However a careful assessment of the factual data, under which a future Israeli-Egyptian warlike situation could develop may not be so pessimistic after all the prospects are soberly examined.
First and foremost, the present regime in Egypt is doing all in its power to maintain its stability and has sofar been successful in subduing some of the most serious threats by extermist elements.
The peace process with Israel survived not only severe crisis outside Egypt, like the 1981 nuclear reactor attack on Bagdad, the 1982 IDF invasion of Lebanon and two bloddstained Intifadas in Palestine, but also the assassination of Anwar Saadat and two attempts on Mubarak, and finally a mutiny of the elite Central Security Forces in 1986 in Egypt. Some extreme acts of religiousely inspired violence during the last decade were put down by ruthless force.
Without going into detail of the various Islamic Fundamentalist movements which have haunted Egyptian internal politics for decades, two of the leading ones should be mentioned in the context of any future developments which could destabilise the moderate regimes.
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyah emerged during the seventies and gained power two decades later, affected by the militant ideology of Sayyid Outb ( executed in 196), who paved the way for the establishment of several Islamic militant branches in Egypt. Operating in self contained and highly conspiratory cells, these have sofar unsuccessfully tried to penetrate the armed forces. The Egyptian Jihad movement has been actively involved in internal terrorism, its mainstream led by the notorious Ayman al-Zawahiri, a key leader in the Osama bin Laden Al-Qaida. The Jihad regards Sheikh Umar Abd-al Rahman, imprisoned in the US as their spritual leader. The goal of both parties is to overthrow the Mubarak regime and replace it with an Islamic state. A serious development, which could have dangerous consequences, should the Islamic fundamentalism gain power elsewhere, is the return of the Afghan veterans, past and present, who are highly trained in subversive activities and sabotage, and have valuable combat experience using modern weapons.
Facing up to such a threat, the Egyptian security forces under General Abd al-Halim Moussa acting as Interior Minister have committed themselves to completely eliminate the Jihad organisation in Egypt, as well as other subversive parties acting to undermine the state.
The regime's cautiouseness is hardly surprising under its past experience: Among the late president Saadat's assassins were a full colonel on active service and another officer in the reserve. In the wake of the 1986 CSF uprisings, no less than 20,000 of its members were dimissed, due to Islamic infiltration. Assassinations of high ranking officials were made possible only by complicity of disloyal officers. Thus Mubarak set about an extensive restructuring program, under which scores of widely dispersed "military cities" were built in remote areas, trying to isolate the military from dangerous civilian society influence. Substantial educational effort has been invested to disqualify Islamic Fundamentalist ideologies, pointing out the discrepancies from basic Islamic theologies that such fundamentalist advocate. Sofar, the effort has paid off and the army remains loyal to the regime, but the crucial question is, for how long this can be sustained, before the growing Islamic influence will eventually infiltrate into those vital security circles.
Operational Considerations
There is little doubt, that the Egyptian armed forces in 2005 are a formidable military power, compared to other Arab nations in the region and that in numbers, at least, it can reach parity with Israel, if the present trend for build-up and modernisation process continues.
However, there are some traditional inherent qualitative weaknesses in its military infrastructure, which cannot be addressed so quickly, even if sufficient funding will be accorded to purchase the necessary hardware.
- there remains an acute shortage of skilled manpower to operate the highly sophisticated weapon systems under modern combat stress.
- Although most of the army is already western trained, the bulk of the senior command still originates from the form Soviet military doctrine, which is too rigid in its command and control system to operate under highly mobile combat situations, which the Egyptian armour will face in the Sinai desert, on which a future campaign could be fought with Israel.
- under the present political system, it is doubtful wether a new initiative by tactical commanders will be encouraged by the leadership, in the forseeable future.
- limited offensive capabilities through lack of sufficient mobile combat support elements, such as modern self propelled and autonomic artillery, mobile air defence assets, advanced and integrated air-ground support procedures and a mobile logistical support tail, all necessary to conduct long- range mobile operations. ( some recent additions, such as the MLRS and Avenger Stinger could become crucial elements, but larger numbers have to be bought to redress this operational deficiency).
- due to geo-topographical constraints in Sinai, any future Egyptian contingency move into the
peninsula against Israel, could become an operational and logistical nightmare for the following reasons:
1. In contrast to former Israeli-Egyptian wars in Sinai, the IDF has redeployed after the withdrawal into the southern Negev, where the bulk of its armoured forces are now located.
2. All major IAF airbases are within striking distance to cover the entire Sinai peninsula, which
which would make any hostile move highly vulnerable to massive airstrikes.
3. A major IDF armour attack, moving into Sinai at short notice, could seize the strategic passes
(Mitla, Jiddi and Tassa) combined with rapid deployed airborne troops, blocking any west-east moves by the Egyptian Third Army into Sinai, and turn the entire western Sinai into a huge armour killing zone.
4. IDF forces could rely on relative short ranged supply support, while the Egyptian forces would have to rely on support bases in the Canal zone, all logistical support movement having to cross the Suez Canal by bridges, ferries, pontoon bridges or a single underwater tunnel, all extremely vulnerable to hostile air attack. Supply ranges would increase as the battle moves eastward.
Much discussion has been over the military importance of the construction of the Ahmed Hamdi tunnel project, under the Suez Canal. The effort of building a permanent crossing of the Canal into Sinai was a vast engineering undertaking, one of the most important projects after the signing of the peace agreement with Israel.
It forecast a traffic crossing capacity of over 60,000 vehicles per day. However, due to erosion water began leaking into the two lane tunnel and extensive restoration work has started to overcome this problem. Moreover, the tunnel also suffered severely from the vibration of heavy loaded trucks. Under such circumstances it is hardly likely, that Egypt considers the Tunnel for military purposes, as it would be quite impossible to move large tank collums under the Canal. Thus, the new project of the 4km cable-stayed car and railway bridge, going up south of Qantara which will hang seventy meters over the Canal, could become the preferred solution, but still be a lucrative target for air attack in a war situation.
Summing Up
Egypt has a strong vested interest to adhere to the present " cold peace" with Israel to continue to reap the benefits from the US and the international community.
As long as the Mubarak regime remains in power a safe estimate is that Egypt will maintain its
present attitude to prevent another war with Israel, clearly aware that it would inevitably result in a catastrophic failure to all its national aspirations.
But such a military adventure could become much more realistic, once the present regime is overthrown by Islamic fundamentalists. Then the strategic ties with the United States and the West could be regarded as adverse to the fundamentalist religious radicals aims and a Pan-Arab nationalistic Jihad against the Jewish infidels could become once again Egypt's prime objective.

Hamas-Hezbollah: An Unholy Alliance
One of the most dangerous developments is currently emerging, following Israel's elimination of the Gaza Hamas leadership, earlier this year.
Having created a power vaccum in the traditional Islamic fundamentalist organisations, it paved the way for the Iranian sponsored Hezbollah to enter the Palestinian Intifada as an active player.
This trend, which has been monitored by Israeli intelligence since 2001, has grown into dangerous proportions after the removal of Saddam Hussein, who had maintained, for many years, the dominant funding source fueling the Palestinian campaign.
Now, with Saddam's regime gone, the Tehran Ayathollahs have moved into this void, becoming the major source, through their Lebanese Hezbollah proxies, providing financial, technical and moral support for the Palestinian factions fighting Israel.
Behind this move, the Ayathollas aim to achieve, their sofar unattained strategic goal, to gain a strong foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean, propagating their political influence in this region. The so-called "Hezbollahland" in South Lebanon, which is under full Shi'ite control since May 2000, when the IDF withdrew from its 'Security Zone', is already a firmly established Iranian outpost, with Hezbollah threatening Israel's northern region through its huge arsenal of short, medium and long range rockets, supplied by Iran.
Ariel Sharon's unilateral disengagement plan for the Gaza Strip is actually providing Tehran's leadership with the second stage of their strategic plan, to confront Israel in a two-, if not three-frontal strategic threat, a perfect scene for a shrewd political blackmailing campaign, which could place the Ayathollahs as dominant actors in the future Mid-East powerplay.
Hamas fits neatly into the Iranian plans, playing a dominant role in Middle Eastern politics. By filling the power vacuum created in Hamas by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin's assassination, Hezbollah was given the unique opportunity to consolidate its position in the Gaza Strip.
A repeat performance of the UN sponsored 'Blue Line' fiasco along the Lebanese-Israeli international border could easily follow under the chaotic turmoil, which will certainly emerge after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.
The Lebanese authorities, unable, or refusing to take control of South Lebanon in May 2000, created Hezbollaland shaping soon, with Iranian help and Syrian acquiesce, into a dangerous strategic threat to Israel.
In the Gaza strip there is not even a central authority available. The 'streets' are controlled by armed militias, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the the Popular Resistance Committees, all currently funded by Hezbollah. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA), although still maintaining a strong security apparatus,
is actually a 'Paper Tiger', unable, or unwilling to exercise its power against the powerful local Islamic fundamentalist warlords.
The coffers of the Palestinian Authority are virtually empty. The corrupt Fatah-Tunis leadership has wasted most of the huge financial assistance to fill its own pockets.
Thus, with the PNA virtually bankrupt, Iran, Syria using their proxy Hezbollah, are now more and more dominating the local scene in all aspects of life in the occupied territories. The once central leadership in Ramallah, has lost its control to local warlords and in the West Bank cities, total chaos rules the streets.
Such a situation can only forebode more dangerous escalation in the endless circle of violence, enhancing the suffering of the two people involved, but would ideally serve the vicious goals in Tehran.
Hezbollah publicly admits supporting Palestinian terrorists
Until recently, Hezbollah was careful to play down the aid it gave Palestinian terrorists and certainly never boasted of it in public.
Then, on the morning of July 19, a bomb killed Ghaleb Awali, 40, outside his home in the Muadad quarter, right in the so-called Shi'ite inner sanctum stronghold of Beirut. According to intelligence sources, Ghaleb Awali ( his nome de guerre "Hajj") headed the highly secret Hezbollah "Special group" working under guidance of the notorious Imad Mughniyeh. Awali was in direct contact with senior Fatah-Tanzim officials in the West Bank and Hamas leaders in the Gaza strip.
Although a little known terrorist group calling itself "Jund Ash Sham" claimed responsibility for the killing, Hezbollah immediately accused Mossad.
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Jund As Sham is a Sunni splinter group of Osbat al-Nour, which is considered more radical than Hamas and PIJ. Active from the Palestinian refugee camp Ayn al Hilwah on the Lebanese coast, under the 'wings' of Colonel Mounir Maqdah, the camp's strongman. Some of its members include remnants of the disbanded Takfir wal Hijra group, which were involved in the 2000 clashes with Lebanese security forces at Dinnieh, north of Tripoli. Unconfirmed reports indicate relations with an Iraqi active terrorist cell named Jund ash-Islam, which is linked to Osama Bin Laden's AlQaeda.
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After the death of Awali who had been a Hezbollah activist directing Palestinian terrorist squads in the PA-administered territories, an enraged Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah publicly announced, for the first time, that his organization was providing support for the insurgents in "occupied Palestine."
In the eulogy he delivered at Awali's funeral, Nasrallah said: "Today we declare Ghaleb Awali a shaheed [martyr for the sake of Allah] of Lebanon. He is also a shaheed of Palestine. That is because Ghaleb Awali was, like Ali Hussein Salah (killed by a similar blast in August 2003) , one of those who devoted the last years of their lives to helping our brothers in occupied Palestine. We do not wish to hide the truth. We state it openly and proudly. Today Ghaleb Awali died for Palestine. He died for Jerusalem. He died for Al-Aqsa. He died confronting the Zionist enterprise…" (Al-Manar Hezbollah TV, Lebanon, July 19, 2004).
Nasrallah's speech drew harsh criticism from within Lebanon . An editorial in the popular Lebanese newspaper Al-Nahar ( Al-Nahar Internet site, July 21, 2004) attacked the speech and the negative influence Hezbollah's aid to Palestinian terrorism was likely to have on Syria and Lebanon. Al-Nahar commentator Sarkis Naoum wrote,
"Worse than what Nasrallah said about [Ghaleb] Awali's death was that he revealed his role in the organization and exposed his part in coordinating between the Islamic resistance in Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance in occupied Palestine. The gravity of the revelation, which was like a kind of admission, is that it confirmed the long-standing Israeli and American accusations that the organization [Hezbollah] 'is involved' in the Palestinian issue and in the Palestinian resistance, arms it, trains it, funds it, and recruits members…"
Hezbollah's Infiltration into the Westbank and Gaza Strip
Although Hezbollah efforts to infiltrate Israel are not new, the current trend of its growing involvement in actively supporting the Intifada is causing the Israeli security community considerable concern.
In a recently declassified document, the Israel Security Agency ( ISA-formerly GSS), renders a rare glimpse into the makings of Hezbollah's activities in the West Bank and Gaza.
In a large scale seek and grab operation in the Nablus Qasbah, Saturday June 24, the IDF oncovered a secret hide-out in a concrete underground bunker. In it were hiding the three top leaders of the local Al Aqsa Brigades, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. All were killed after a short firefight by handgrenades lobbed into the cache.Naef Abu Sharh, the head of the Al Aqsa brigade in Nablus and a key link to Hezbollah in the West Bank, was the prime target of the raid. According to ISA reports, Abu Sharh maintained close relations with Nafez A'araj, a former Palestinian Islamic Jihad activists and currently Hezbollah link in Gaza, who manages the Hezbollah sponsored Al Ansar Charity Association which is funding families of suicide bombers and Palestinian prisoners. Al Ansar personal accounts found in Nablus banks were under the name of Yamam Faraj, a senior fugitive, head of the PFLP military infrastructure in Nablus, as well as Naef Abu Sharh were recently uncovered in a raid.
On 15 December 2003, the ISA had uncovered a dangerous terrorist cell in the Gaza Strip which was directly operated by Hezbollah agents. The leader of this cell, Shadi Abu Alhatzin, a 22-year old Khan Yunis resident, was arrested while preparing a remote controlled unmanned aerial platform packed with explosives to attack an Israeli position. His personal details are of interest, as they indicate a dangerous trend which is developing in the territories.
Alhatzin, married and father of two children was born in Yemen in 1981 to a Palestinian father and lebanese mother. He came with his family to Gaza in 1991 settling in Khan Yunis studying pharmacology at the Khan Yunis technical college. Joining the Fatah-affiliated " Shabiba" youth movement, he received
his first military training, in Hamas summer camps.
Under ISA interrogation Alhatzin admitted that he first became exposed to Hezbollah activities by watching Al Manar TV broadcasts, which listed an e-mail address for interested candidates whishing to join the organisation.
In 2000 Shadi made contact with Hezbollah via a Lebanese relative, Hassan Dukmak, who willingly sent him funds to finance his activities in Gaza.
A local Hezbollah agent then took over jointly establishing the Khan Yunis cell, which perpetrated several rocket, mortar and shooting attacks in the Gaza Strip against Israeli settlements and IDF positions. Alhatzin's links with his Hezbollah contacts in Lebanon were carried out via e-mail, which instructed him to expand the Khan Yunis cell, enhancing its capabilities.
In 2002 Shadi received instructions to build an explosive-laden model airplane in order to fly this into an Israeli position ( see JTIC 24 February 2003 Exploding Toy Planes). Several thousand dollars were transferred to secret accounts in Gaza banks to purchase machine tools and cover production costs.
During that time, Alhatzin tried twice to dispatch personal emissaries to Lebanon for special sabotage training. Bassam Abu Nimr, 38 from Khan Yunis and Ismail Garabeli, 30 from Rafah-were arrested by the ISA on their return from Egypt.
Garabeli admitted to his interrogators, that he met with a Hezbollah agent in Cairo, who gave him $700 and a flight ticket to Turkey, where he would be ferried to a Hezbollah training camp in the Lebanese Beqa'a Valley.
For several years Hezbollah has been instructing Palestinian activists in its IRGC- run training camps. Hamas recruits underwent basic military and sabotage courses at the Iranian Revolutionary Guards training facility at Jenata Camp in the Beqa'a, coordinated by Brigadier General Ali Reza Tamizi, who was the officer in charge of the IRGC in Lebanon. Included in the instruction program was the operation of SA-7 Strela, short range Katyusha rockets and shoulder launched RPG. A key figure in this Iranian sponsored activity, was the charismatic Fatah commander in Lebanon, Colonel Munir Al-Makdah, the actual go-between Hamas and Hezbollah.
The lethal results of this advanced training had already surfaced in 2002, when Hamas managed to blow up two IDF Merkava Mk3 tanks by ultra-heavy IEDs culminating last May, by the fearful destruction of the two IDF explosive laden M113 APCs through RPG in Zaytoun and Rafah.
The February 2004 bulletin issued by the Center for Special Studies (CSS), which is the official organ of the Israeli intelligence community, reveals the growing level of Hezbollah's involvement in a special study.
According to CSS, Jordan has become a significant platform for launching Hezbollah intelligence activities in the West Bank.
Ibrahim Ajwa,48 a Jordanian resident, heads the Abu Mousa Fatah terror network in Amman.
The Abu Mousa faction broke away from the Fatah mainstream organisation
in 1983, its leader, a former Fatah colonel resides in Damascus and maintains close ties with Hezbollah.
The recent arrest of three Nablus-based Fatah activists-all brothers-, led to links of extensive financial assistance rendered to the Palestinian Intifada by the Iranian Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC). Channeling funds through Hezbollah operatives in Jordan, huge sums were transferred to secret Ramallah based bank accounts, some of which were seized by the controversial IDF/ISA operation last February.
On July 2003, Fadi Nazmi Hamdi Abuda, a key Fatah Tanzim operative was arrested in an IDF raid. Fadi served as general secretary of the Fatah student's movement, the "Shabibah" at Al-Najah university Nablus, one of the key centers of Palestinian terrorist activities in the West Bank. Under interrogation, Fadi revealed his contacts with Fouad Balbisi, a Fatah activist operating from Amman, Jordan. Balbisi acts as coordinator of links between Fatah and Iran, funneling funds via Hezbollah bank accounts in Beirut.
Another contact of Fadi was Ali Hussein Saleh, a key operative with the Lebanon based IRGC. Israeli intelligence suspected Saleh to act as liaison between Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist cells in the West Bank. Last August, Hussein Saleh was killed by a mysterious explosion travelling in his car. The ISA report mentioned Saleh being the Lebanese contact to Kamel Taha Ahmad Ghanem, heading the Fatah Tanzim cell in Yassir Arafat's Muqata compound.
In December 2003 the ISA achieved a major coup, which could have lasting effect on Hezbollah activities in the West Bank. In a night raid on Hamas cells in Ramallah, last December, ISA arrested Haldun Ruhi Asfour Bargouti, of Syrian origin. Haldun told his interrogators that Hezbollah was attempting to infiltrate cell phones with inbuilt advanced GPS to Hamas. This new device, which can be operated from a car cigarette lighter socket, is highly accurate and experts believe that it could be used to range mortars or rockets onto high profile targets.
But Hezbollah activities in establishing its undercover cells in the Palestinian West Bank are not its only effort. For years, especially after Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon, Hezbollah has been trying to build its independent infrastructure among the Israeli Arab community focusing foremost on the Galilee.
Two Israeli Arabs from Reine, near Nazareth gave evidence of their contacts with Hezbollah agents. Ghassan Athamlah was recruited to Hezbollah by a Jordanian representative of the Abu Mousa faction. Athamlah then sent his younger brother, Sirhan to a Hezbollah training camp in Lebanon, where he was taught the 'art' of sabotage, using high-grade C-4 explosives and weapons training. Sirhan was directed to perpetrate terrorist acts against Israeli targets, but was arrested on his return to Israel.
Hezbollah also recuited several Druse residents from villages in the north of Israel and the Golan Heights. The Alawite border village of Ghajar, which is divided between between Israel and Lebanon has become the key center of trans-border drug and arms smuggling operations.
In July 2002 a gang of drug dealers from Nazareth and Ghajar was arrested. Suspected of illegally selling computer software, maps and military equipment into Lebanon, and in return smuggled explosives, including Claymore mines from Hezbollah depots into the West Bank, they revealed their activities to their interrogators.
Their information led to the arrest of an IDF officer named Omar al-Hayb from the village of Beit-Zarzir, who had maintained long-time relations with Lebanese drug baron Kamil Nahara.
Israeli and Lebanese drug dealers often act as couriers between Hezbollah and their Israel based clandestine cells. One of these links was uncovered recently, when two detainees revealed smuggling Israeli mobile phones into Lebanon, with which Israeli cell-phone networks could be monitored. One of these was found on the body of a slain terrorist killed in an attack on northern Israel.
Last, but not least, Hezbollah has been involved in at least three major arms smuggling attempts by sea. The first of these was carried out on the MS Santorini, which was sized on on its third trip to Gaza on 6 May 2001.
Some interesting information was revealed since by a recent declassified ISA report, on this incident.
One of the Santorini crew, Dib Muhammad Rashid Awita told his interrogators that the original boat was registered in Syria under the name of MS Abd al-Hadi, based at Tartus port. Bought by Hezbollah agents and registered in Lebanon under its new name the Santorini evaded the Israeli navy blockade several times until finally caught on May 6, 2001.
The Santorini's last voyage was carefully prepared under a strict military operation, due to its valuable load. No less than 25 Hezbollah operatives secured the beach head, all nearby access roads were sealed off and the boat sailed escorted by Hezbollah Zodiacs until reaching high sea. In overall charge of the operation was Hezbollah commander Hajj Bassam.
A year later the IDF intercepted the largest yet Iranian-Hezbollah sponsored shipment of arms by seizing the Karine A in the Red Sea.
In May 2003 Israel captured an Egyptian fishing boat off Gaza, the Abu Hassan. On bord was Masalem Mussa Abu Amra a known Hezbollah explosive expert sent to Hamas in Gaza to instruct advanced IED technology. In his possession were found no less than 35 CD disks displaying instructions on explosive charge construction.
Hamas and Hezbollah Alliance in Gaza
Hezbollah's aims to infiltrate Hamas have for years been high on their strategic list. However, as long as Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was alive, its role was limited mainly to provide technical support to the Hamas military activities.
Yassin was not merely the principal founder of Hamas, but its prime spiritual leader, dominating its disciples by his charisma and reputation. Yassin strived to maintain Hamas independence throughout his leadership tenure, even when incarcerated in Israeli jails. He strongly opposed attempts by Iran and Hezbollah to directly intervene into Hamas activities, although he willingly accepted their technical and to some extent, after the closure of Saddam Hussein's lifeline, limited Iranian financial support.
All this changed rapidly after his demise. His immediate successor, Dr Abdelaziz Rantisi, quickly invited Hezbollah to play a guiding role in the Hamas Gaza branch, which was denied to them by Sheikh Yassin. The prospects of a dangerous 'unholy alliance' between Hezbollah and Hamas, was probably the decisive factor behind Israel's decision to eliminate Rantisi only shortly after his taking over the Hamas leadership in April.
But Rantisi's demise did not halt the Hezbollah gaining more and more influence in the Gaza Strip. Its image among the Gaza masses skyrocketed following Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah's monumental achievement to release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners in the dubious January exchange, something that the PNA had never managed to attain during all its negotiations with Israel.
Hezbollah's absorption of Hamas in Gaza, which is rapidly gaining momentum, will have enormous implications, as Sharon's disengagment plan is shaping into a timetable. While the Israelis are discussing pulling their troops out of the Gaza Strip and struggling with the settlers, whom they will have to evacuate, the Hezbollah is solidifying its hold. Their success in gaining a strong foothold before the Israelis leave, will render them to become the de facto power in Gaza, regardless of wether Hamas or the PNA will be in nominal control.
Having the experience from 18 years guerilla war against the IDF, the financial backing from Tehran and its ever growing links to Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, it hardly needs lots of imagination to estimate the new threat, which Israel will face, once Hezbollah deploys its rockets along the 80km border fence in Gaza.
Sofar, Hamas has been unable to extend the range of their Qassam rockets to reach Ashkelon, although a year ago first attempts to launch a 9km rocket did reach its southern outskirts. Hamas rocket experts, aided by Hezbollah instructors have managed to develop a +17km (?) Qassam- 3 rocket, which was test fired last August into the Mediterranean. This rocket could hit Ashkelon's center, in which over a hundred thousand Israelis live.
On June 18 Israel radio reported an advanced type of Qassam rocket hitting Sderot east of the Gaza Strip. Police officials mentioned this to be the first Nasser-3 rocket, carrying a heavier explosive payload, but maintaining its predecessors's limited range. The Nasser-3 could indicate that more developments in rocketry could be expected, as new technologies supplied by Hezbollah experts become available.
But a major threat of strategic proportions will become reality, once Hezbollah manages to enter its Katyusha type rockets into the Strip.
Israeli intelligence has already detected hidden depots of BM-21 rockets in northern Sinai, ready to be smuggled into the Gaza Strip. With their deployment, vital strategic targets, such as the power station at Ashkelon as well as Israel's major port of Ashdod will come within rocket fire range.
Should this trend not be eliminated in time, Israel will face a situation, which could threaten their north from Hezbollah in Lebanon, their center from Hezbolla-Fatah cells in the West Bank and Hezbollah-Hamas from the Gaza Strip.
No nation wishing to survive can tolerate such a mortal threat, without reacting drastically.