Why would Iran Want Cruise Missiles?

According to Israel’s outgoing Intelligence chief, Major General Aharon Ze'evi (Farkash) Iran recently acquired 12 cruise missiles with a range of up to 3,000 kilometers. Speaking at the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) Foreign Affairs & Defense Committee, last Tuesday, December 20, Farkash claimed that the missiles had the ability to carry a nuclear warhead. News reports had already mentioned last March, that Ukrainian arms dealers had smuggled 18 nuclear-capable cruise missiles to Iran and China in 1999-2001.

On the same day, the Hamburg based Bild Zeitung quoted reports by BND (German Intelligence) sources saying that Iran had purchased 18 kits of BM-25 Mobile missiles from North Korea. The German tabloid further claimed that the BND has intelligence indicating Iranian scientists are working intensively to attach nuclear warheads to its missiles. Near Tabriz, 600 km North of Teheran, the BND has allegedly located a test-pad for silo based missiles. The BND also warned that China had shipped aluminum rings to Iran which could be used to build multi-stage rockets with a range of 10,000 km and which could reach the United States. Defense-Update was unable to confirm any of these reports, and its in-depth investigation could not establish technical data for a so-called BM-25 cruise missile under North Korean origin.

There is however, sufficient data available over the controversial 18 nuclear capable cruise missile deal originating from the Ukraine. An international ruckus started already on 28 January 2005, when Ukrainian parliamentarian Hryhoriy Omelchenko issued an open letter to President Viktor Yushchenko that Ukraine had illegally sold cruise missiles to Iran. It was a credible report, which mentioned dates, names, the bank accounts and fictitious shell companies that were set up to extradite the transfer of money from Iran. Plus there was collaborating evidence to this whole affair. Omelchenko referred to a "paper company" set up in Cyprus to channel money for the missiles.

Last March, following persistent political unrest, Ukrainian Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk finally admitted, that several hundred of his country's missiles were ‘unaccounted’ for. The weapons, including 575 X-55 and X-55M were supposed to have been decommissioned in the years that followed the break-up of the USSR. On 22 March 2005, Prosecutor General of Ukraine, Svyatoslav Piskun, reluctantly confessed in an interview with the Financial Times that Kiev had sold 18 strategic X-55 air-to-surface cruise missiles to Beijing and Tehran in 2001. The somewhat ‘shady’ agreement was fraudulently arranged by official Ukrainian ministry departments, intelligence sources said. It came to light, following an investigation, which revealed that the missile deal was based on a fabricated contract with the Russian state-owned Rosvooruzhenie Corporation. A dubious document, apparently unsigned by a responsible person, merely stated, according to these reports, that it was filed on February 1st 2004 by the Ukrainian arms export company, Ukraviazakaz.

The X-55 (also termed Kh-55 Granat or AS-15 Kent) has a range of approximately 3,000 km and is capable of carrying 200 kiloton nuclear warheads. Like the US Tomahawk cruise missile, the AS-15 is designed to fly subsonic at a low altitude. Launched from long-range strike aircraft, once operational, it can potentially place Israel as well as targets in Europe under threat. As the weapon is designed to destroy fixed-position targets, such as for example, Israel’s Dimona nuclear center it could become an extremely valuable strategic deterrence system for Tehran. However, there are experts who doubt Iran’s intention to mount nuclear warheads on cruise missiles. Doug Richardson, editor of Jane’s Missiles and Rockets Magazine claims, that the Iranian technicians would prefer to use the fast Shahab ballistic missiles as their ideal nuclear carrier, than the slow cruise missile.

But due to its nature, the cruise missile is smaller and therefore much less visible to radar detection than aircraft or ballistic missiles. For example, due to the Earth’s curvature, ground-based radar can detect a low flying cruise missile that is about 20 miles away. In comparison, an aircraft flying at 10,000 feet can be detected when it is about 150 miles distant. New generation cruise missiles incorporating stealth features make them even less visible to radar and infrared detectors. Multiple missiles could attack instantaneously from different directions, and can fly circuitous routes to get to different targets. There is no doubt, that for Tehran, long range cruise missiles tipped with atomic bombs would provide an attractive capability for attacking Israel.

Intelligence reports note that while Iran does not operate long-range bombers designed to launch X-55 cruise missiles, but experts believe that Tehran could adapt its Soviet-built Su-24 strike aircraft to launch the missile. However the multiple launch modes of this missile, which can also be launched from ships or from land based truck launchers offers various alternatives. These later modes are certainly the ones relevant to Iran. The Soviet sea and ground launched versions of the missile offer a small solid rocket motor that would boost the missile to cruising speed. Iran would have no undue technical problems to make some provisions in replicating this equipment. Indeed, derivative land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) for theater warfighting and strategic attack could become extremely attractive. Such a missile, even if launched from Iranian territory, could still hit any country in the Middle East, including Israel, and especially, US forces stationed in the region. For such a development, Iran would well be interested in purchasing modified versions of SS-6-N mobile missiles kits from Pyongyang, such as mentioned in the German Bild Zeitung report.

But there may be other sources, willing to supply Tehran’s needs for cruise missile kits as well. Reports of uncertain reliability claim that China is working on several advanced ground-based LACMs: the Changfeng ["Long Wind"] CF-1/ CF-2, and the Hong Niao (HN)-1/ HN-2 missile, with a range between 400 km and 1,800 km, with conventional and possibly nuclear warheads. The ground-launched Hong Niao missiles are fitted with tandem solid-rocket boosters. Ironically, perhaps In 1995 it was reported that China was funding the Israeli development of an air-launched cruise missile based on the Israeli Delilah anti-radiation attack drone, with a 230-mile range. The new missile reportedly was to be larger than the Delilah, while retaining its basic configuration.

While no system is impenetrable, an active defense is possible. In an article in the spring 2002 issue of The National Interest, Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution advocated a system of radar, perhaps held up by aerostat balloons, together with the existing network of U.S.-based fighter aircraft and a new series of surface-to-air missile sites, which could provide at least some coverage to all of the nation’s borders. That network might not provide leak-proof defense in all cases, but it could stop most small attacks with high confidence and deny any attacker certainty that his cruise missiles would reach U.S. territory once fired. The US Army is already planning to develop new cruise missile defenses by 2008 or 2010, in response to increased proliferation and technology available for such threats.

Still, Israeli security officials are very concerned with the present reports over Iran’s new interest in cruise missile technology and its WMD potential. A cruise missile is decidedly more suitable platform for delivering biological and chemical payloads than a Scud. The missile’s steady horizontal flight pattern permits release of the agent along a line of contamination, and enables the cruise missile to release and spray agent at right angles to the wind.

But mounting an effective defense against incoming cruise missiles presents tremendous challenges. Unlike a ballistic missile, it is hard to detect a cruise missile when it is launched. The X-55 flies at medium altitude for the first part of its flight. Although a cruise missile travels at subsonic speed comparable to that of an airplane, it can fly at low altitude and weave in between mountain ranges to minimize the risk of detection. The missiles are much more difficult for SAMs and other air defenses to track or attempt to engage. One way to effectively deal with cruise missiles is to use AWACS to guide fighters to intercept the missiles. Coverage by radar-borne aerostats and point defense missiles, such as the US SLAMRAAM or Israeli medium-range Spyder are another solution. Indeed, trying to intercept cruise missiles over land is a difficult challenge for the defending side. For example, due to the Earth’s curvature, ground-based radar can detect a low flying cruise missile that is about 20 miles away. In comparison, an aircraft flying at 10,000 feet can be detected when it is about 150 miles.

In fact, cruise missiles have already been used in combat in the Persian Gulf. In March 29, 2003 a cruise missile thought to be an Iraqi CSSC-3 Silkworm missile exploded in Kuwait City's harbor, narrowly missing the popular Souk Sharq mall. Kuwait City's air defenses did not give warning that an attack was imminent. The Silkworm has an operational range from 51 to125 miles and flies at a very low altitude of several hundred feet above sea level. Intelligence assessments indicate that Iran has purchased supersonic 3M82 Moskit sea-skimming missiles (NATO code-name SS-N-22 (“Sunburn” or Mosquito) anti-shipping cruise missiles, which are extremely fast, giving the defender a maximum of 25-30 second response time until impact.

Why Israel should Not Attack Iran?

The London Sunday Times correspondent Uzi Mahnaimi reported Sunday that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has ordered the IDF to prepare to attack Iran's nuclear facilities at the end of March 2006, after Israeli intelligence supposedly discovered a number of secret uranium enrichment sites that were disguised as civilian buildings. The day before, Dr. Mohamed El-Baradei Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) received the Nobel Peace Prize for his activities for world peace. In his press review, he appeared to warn Israel not to bomb Iranian atomic reactors.

Military analysts frequently refer to Israel’s dramatic attack on the Iraqi Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981, being a reasonable precedent to mount a similar attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. However, a more sober professional assessment would immediately reveal that the Osiraq precedence seems totally irrelevant, due to the currently prevailing circumstances.

• First, the Iraqi reactor was a single target, easily to identify on first ingress by the attackers and only lightly defended.
• Second, the attack came under total surprise without any previous fanfare warning in the media.
• Third, it took place when Iraq was at war with Iran and the latter had already attempted a similar attack, which had, alas, failed.
• The cynical claim, that Israeli leaders would recklessly stake the lives of young pilots, the very cream of their elite, on such a risky undertaking seems at best totally unfounded, considering the inquisitive media in a democratic state like Israel, which virtually ‘rules’ the political agenda.

According to leading oriental experts, Iran’s prime worries would not be Israel, which has no borders with the Shi’ite state and, apart from somewhat irresponsible rhetoric by its politicians, does not really threaten its national security. In fact, during the Shah period, Israel and Iran maintained closest strategic relations in mutual interest.

Dr. Guy Bechor, Middle East Affairs analyst from the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, believes that Israel should "keep a low profile against escalation" because despite Iranian rhetoric, Israel is not the only country being threatened. The Shihab-3 missiles threaten not only Israel but primarily the surrounding Gulf States, which are oil-producing nations, says Bechor. Stressing that Iran is also developing the Shihab-4 with a range that could strike Western Europe, Bechor questions the rationality for Iran in developing these longer-range missiles, if it is only intended to attack Israel." Iran is building itself as a superpower, not against Israel but against the Western world." Dr Bechor argues.

A major element of Israel’s deterrent is the state of its national defensive posture. The state of Israel is the only one, which has an effective defensive triad infrastructure. The already deployed Arrow 2 antiballistic missile, incorporated within the Homa multilayer active defense system, is the only operational antiballistic missile defense available in the world today. Although not 100% hermetic against incoming salvoes of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), it nevertheless poses a viable deterrent to any potential attacker, risking a second strike retaliation by the defender. There is also one of the world’s best passive defense infrastructures available in Israel, protecting the population against most attack modes, including explosives, chemical and biological weapons. In contrast, all Arab and Muslim nations in the region do not have nor active or passive defense measures fielded, making them highly vulnerable to massive attack.

As for Israel’s offensive response options, according to unofficial sources in Israel, the Jericho -2 intermediate-range missile (IRBM), a two-stage, solid-fueled missile with estimated range of 1,500 to 3,500 km is in its arsenal and operational. Foreign sources have repeatedly reported on Israel’s nuclear potential, although Israel continues to adhere on its ambiguous doctrine on this issue.The arrival of the first of three 1,925 ton Type 800 Dolphin class submarines in 1999 was described by the then Prime Minister Ehud Barak as a move that would "change the entire face of the navy and the long-arm capability". This was widely attributed to Israeli plans to arm the submarines with cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads. It was reckoned that the virtually undetectable submarines would provide Israel with a 'second-strike' capability and complete the country's triad of nuclear deterrents.

Israel is certainly not alone in its concern about the threat from nuclear armed ‘rogue’ states like the Islamic fundamentalist Tehran. A senior White House source said recently that the threat of a nuclear Iran was moving to the top of the international agenda. A military source in Washington said “If we should opt for the military strike, it must be not less than 100% successful’. To carry out an operation according to these expectations seems highly questionable. The targets in Iran are widely dispersed and in deep underground shelters, with camouflaged decoy sites. Moreover, historical examples indicate that even a successful and sustained strategic bombing campaign in WW2 could hardly paralyze the highly organized German military production infrastructure and in several cases even caused not only its astonishing recovery, but actually increased production! Such a highly complex military operation is no viable option for a single state like Israel, despite all its available military potential and expertise.

Without going into operational details here, only plotting ingress and egress routes to ensure survivability of retrievable assets would become highly critical in the planning phase, taking into account the prevailing strategic conditions in the Gulf , Iraq and Saudia, and with US military presence dominmant in the region. In fact, senior analysts claim that "An Israeli counter-threat against the Iranians would play into Tehran's hands - distracting the United States, by mitigating U.S. pressure upon Tehran." To emphasize this, one remembers that Vice President Dick Cheney publicly raised the possibility last January, that Israel "might well decide to act first" to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons in an interview on the MSNBC program. When asked, "Why don't we make Israel do it?" It was a reference to a military option much discussed in Washington but rarely talked about in public by top officials. "Well, one of the concerns people have is that Israel might do it without being asked," Mr. Cheney said. "If, in fact, the Israelis became convinced the Iranians had a significant nuclear capability, given the fact that Iran has a stated policy that their objective is the destruction of Israel, the Israelis might well decide to act first, and let the rest of the world worry about cleaning up the diplomatic mess afterwards."

Silvan Shalom, the Israeli foreign minister, said he believed that diplomacy was the only way to deal with the issue. But he warned: “The idea that this tyranny of Iran will hold a nuclear bomb is a nightmare, not only for us but for the whole world.” Under these stringent conditions, why should Israel opt volunteering to spearhead the Free World’s fight against Iran instead of keeping a low profile on its national priorities and let others take the lead, keeping the world safe from certain doomsday?

The Threat of Maritime Terrorism

On Friday, December 9, 2005 the Jerusalem Post reported that The Israel Navy has decided to cease sending its warships through the Suez Canal, out of concern they will be targeted by global Jihad terrorists. Isral is concerend about the threat of maritime terror for some time. Recent activities attempting to disrupt plans to attack Israeli maritime targets focused on diverting Israel bound passenger ships, visiting Turkish and Cypriot ports, and intensive naval activities in the eastern Mediterranean sea.

Unconfirmed reports indicate that Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal have been placed on high alert, Saturday December 10, pending suspected terrorist attacks on shipping originating from their Sinai base. The Suez Canal has long become a major focal point for maritime terrorism, since the establishment of the new al strongholds in the Central Sinai mountain redoubt of Jebel Hillal and covert activities in the Sharm-al-Sheikh and Tiran Straits area. Scuttling a captured cargo ship blocking the strategic canal is just one of the many contingencies possible. A less spectacular attack, by land-based RPG rockets could equally affect shipping and virtually stop all canal traffic, with serious consequences.

A recent U.S. intelligence warning to Mediterranean nations, including Israel, said significant attacks could take place in the Suez Canal and other "choke points" -- narrow channels where vulnerable ships, if damaged or sunk, would significantly disrupt commerce. As a precautionary measure, the US Navy has diverted at least 12 massive supply ships from the Suez Canal and sent them around the Cape of Good Hope instead.

Maritime terror Mastermind
There is indeed compelling evidence that ships are al-Qaeda's new weapons of choice. When Abd al Rahman al Nashiri was captured by US intelligence agents in November 2002, the scope of Al-Qaeda maritime activities was revealed for the first time in detail. Al Nashiri, Osama Bin Laden’s operations chief in the Persian Gulf and Yemen, masterminded the suicide attack on the guided missile destroyer USS Cole in October 2002, as well as an identical attempt nine months earlier, on the destroyer The USS Sullivans, which failed when the suicide boat overloaded with explosives was sunk. Nashiri, an explosive expert specializing in naval demolition sabotage, had developed a four-pronged strategy to attack Western shipping targets:

• Ramming vulnerable vessels at sea
• Blowing up medium-sized vessels at ports
• Attacking vulnerable, large cargo ships such as supertankers from the air by using explosive-laden small aircraft
• Underwater attacks by divers or suicide demolition teams, using limpet mines.

By capturing Nashiri, coalition forces also seized an al-Qaida maritime military manual. The manual dealt with how to attack ships, showing different classes of vessels, where to hit them and how much explosives are needed. Replacing al Nashiri was Saud Hamid al-Utaibi, marine terror practitioner, who has already caused many security experts to raise the threat level for maritime security. His personal experience includes an active role in blowing up the USS Cole and the attack of a French oil tanker MV Limburg off the Yemen coast. US naval intelligence repeatedly warned Mediterranean states of imminent maritime terrorist threats, including such involving chemical attacks. Utaibi’s highly professional expertise was proven again in December 2004, during a daring commando attack on the US consulate in the Red Sea port city of Jeddah. Al Qaeda websites revealed that maritime attacks could also involve the use of small underwater craft, such as mini-submarines or submerged diver delivery vessels (SDV). Some terrorist groups are known to have experimented with such methods. Intelligence reports point out that radicals from the Jemaah Islamiah (JI), a group linked to the al-Qaeda network, have been trained in sea-borne guerilla tactics, such as suicide scuba diving and ramming, developed by the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Lately, Al Qaeda has discovered the ancient game of piracy, a convenient vehicle for their maritime terrorism purpose. Until recently, Indonesia posed the most dangerous waters for international shipping, with 44 pirate attacks alone in its waters in the first half of 2002 and nine more in the nearby Strait of Molucca.

Terrorist Use of Hazardous Cargo
One of the worst fears from piracy on maritime shipping presents the transportation of MOX (mixed oxide) fuel rods. MOX is reprocessed from spent, concentrated uranium fuel rods. The spent rods are separated into plutonium, radioactive waste and the remaining unused uranium. Recombining the plutonium and uranium in Mox pellets creates a fuel, capable of being returned to a power plant's reactor. When British ships carrying such dangerous nuclear fuel to Japan first stirred controversy, it was feared they might accidentally sink, or at the very worst meet pirates. Now the fear has become hysterical, should al Qaeda naval commandos capture such a highly lucrative cargo. Western Naval intelligence and nuclear experts have warned that enough plutonium from Mox could serve in constructing a crude nuclear device or a ‘dirty’ bomb.

In fact, counter-terrorism experts claim, that there are munitions, like shaped charges which are capable in breaching the armored casks housing the material on board the ship itself, which on exploding could disperse sufficient radio-active material around the immediate neighborhood, such as, for example a major port, where the terrorists could dock.

Israeli environment officials have recently warned of ‘high-risk’ cargos entering Haifa port and ordered enhanced security measures to prevent an ecological disaster occurring though terrorism infiltration. In 2003 the 35 heavily armed pirates/terrorists that boarded a chemical tanker off the coast of Sumatra demanded that the ship's captain teach them how to "drive" such a large ship. This was frighteningly reminiscent of the 9/11 hijackers who attended flight school, but were only interested in learning how to fly an airliner, not land it. It does not require much fantasy to imagine what could happen, should terrorists blow up the tanker and create an ecological disaster in a large coastal town.

Maritime Terrorism and Piracy
Last summer the center of pirate activities has reached the Somali coast. Somali pirates attacked five ships in a sharp rise of banditry apparently directed from a mysterious "mother ship" prowling the busy Indian Ocean corridor. In one incident, pirates attacked with rocket-propelled grenades and assault rifles firing at a U.S.-owned luxury liner. Gunmen in two small speedboats, tried to board the vessel repelled by the ship's defensive maneuvers and countermeasures. A more serious attempt to attack maritime shipping occurred on a Friday, last August as the Abdullah al-Azzam Brigades of the al Qaeda Organization in the Levant and Egypt, announced over the Internet that its “fighters” had fired three Katyusha rockets at “US vessels in Jordan and at Israel’s Eilat airfield… before returning safely to base.” The two US warships, USS Ashland and USS Kearsage, escaped unhit, but were likely to be carefully chosen targets, experts said. These vessels are among those that have been regularly docking and unloading military supplies in the Red Sea port of Aqaba since the U.S. led the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The Suez Canal has become a major focal point for maritime terrorism, since the establishment of the new al Qaeda base in their Central Sinai mountain redoubt of Jebel Hillal and covert activities in the Sharm-al-Sheikh Tiran Straits. Scuttling a captured cargo ship blocking the strategic canal is just one of the many contingencies for such an act.

In 2003 British intelligence sources reported that al-Qaeda network has purchased at least 15 ships in the last two years – creating, perhaps, the first terrorist naval force in modern history. The source claimed that Lloyds of London has helped Britain's MI6 and the U.S. CIA trace the sales made through a Greek shipping agent. The biggest concern was that the ships, flying flags of Yemen or Somalia, were registered to carry chemical cargo, which could become convenient platforms for terrorist maritime activities. A Rand Corporation study recently released warned that terrorists might indeed use containers to deliver weapons of mass destruction for terror groups such as al-Qaeda and offload these in port.

That such a threat is real can demonstrate an incident on September 16, 2001, when the United States closed the port of Boston, fearing terrorists would attack the gas terminal in the harbor. Since, to this day, all gas tankers bound for Boston have to be escorted by the Coast Guard from hundreds of miles outside port. An actual attack on the strategic port of Ashdod did take place in March this year, when Palestinian terrorists hiding in a container attempted to blow themselves up near tanks containing hazardous chemical material, luckily they exploded before reaching their target, but nevertheless killed several people.

Naval Counter-Terrorism Task Forces
Western naval authorities have already fielded some maritime counter terror measures to try and curb the growing threat. Two NATO task forces are operating in the Mediterranean, one under Spanish command guarding ships passing through the Straits of Gibraltar under Operation Active Effort, and another in the Eastern Mediterranean through - Operation Active Endeavour - monitoring and on some occasions boarding shipping moving up from the Suez Canal. The Eastern Mediterranean group, supported by the NATO Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and Mediterranean in rotation, has been conducting boarding of suspected ships under the new Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO). East of Suez, in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the surrounding countries these activities have prompted the United States to establish a joint task force, bolstered by other countries' forces in the area. Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was established in November 2001, with its headquarters afloat aboard the U.S. Navy command ship Mount Whitney. In April 2002, the existence of a multinational naval force, Task Force 150, was revealed. This task force is working in this area, alongside CJTF-HOA to monitor, inspect, board, and stop suspect shipping. The Spanish frigate Navarra which operated as part of this force, intercepted the North Korean vessel Sosan carrying Scud missiles to Yemen on Dec. 9, 2002.

In order to protect strategic merchant shipping, the US navy also provides sensors of the sort used on warships, to detect nearby diving activity. Such sensors are installed on supertankers carrying sensitive cargoes. These detectors should be connected via satellite to centrally monitored systems to prevent them being overridden or ignored by corrupt local officials. Other countermeasures include a comprehensive array of cargo scanners, currently under development, to locate, track, and verify the identity and origin of cargo.

Iran's Point Defense Upgraded

Russia has signed a deal with Iran to sell 29 of its TOR M-1 Anti-Aircraft/Anti-Missile systems, a development that will complicate any planned pre-emptive attack on the rogue nation's nuclear facilities. Russian officials claim the Tor system is "a weapon of defense" and does not represent a danger to the U.S. as long as Washington does not attack Iran.

The 9K331 Tor [SA-15 GAUNTLET land-based, SA-N-9 naval version] low-to-medium altitude SAM system is capable of engaging not only aircraft and helicopters but also RPVs, precision-guided weapons and low flying cruise missiles. The sophisticated Tor system could ensure reliable protection for government, industrial and military sites.

Western intelligence reports indicate that efforts to increase Iran's air defense capability have lately been stepped up. Mostafa Mohammed Najjar, minister of Defense and Logistics Procurement stated clearly in the Parliament "developing and expanding the air defence system and missiles are the highlights of the programmes of the (Iran) defence industries". Sofar the Iranians have been unable to build a nationwide, integrated air defense network. As a result, the Iranian military relies entirely on point defense of key locations using surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries. The present Iranian air defense arsenal includes small numbers of Chinese model SA-2s and Russian SA-5 and SA-6 SAMs. Substantial efforts have been made for years to purchase the highly capable SA-10 Grumble missile system that the Russians have been aggressively marketing as the S-300. According to intelligence assessments, the heaviest-defended areas include Tehran and R&D and production centers involved in the Iranian nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs. One key facility defended with the antiaircraft weapons is the nuclear complex at Bushehr.

Iran air defense Update
The existing early warning systems, built in the 1950s under the auspices of CENTO, were upgraded in the 1970s with a modern air defense radar network. Following the 1979 Khomeini Revolution, Washington canceled an ordered AWACS sale, which left the air force's SA-2 and SA-6 SAM battalions and eight improved Hawk battalions as the basis for Iran's air defense. Five squadrons containing ageing British Rapier and obsolete Tigercat missiles as well as Swedish RBS-70 short-range missiles were used primarily for short range, low level defense (primarily air bases), but there is an acute shortage of spare parts to keep the systems combat ready. In 1995 Russia agreed to sell Tehran five batteries of their Almaz SA-5 ‘Gammon’ SAMs , the Iranian air defense corps declared these operational in 1997.

The SA-5 substantially improved Iran’s air defense capacity at the time, yet, with modest acceleration and limited maneuverability, the Gammon was designed to intercept strategic bombers, and could not be updated to engage highly maneuverable strike fighters and precision guided weapons. Furthermore, its mechanically steered radars are vulnerable to saturation by decoys and jammers. The five batteries currently in the inventory would be able to deploy around up to six prime objectives only. There were persistent reports in the professional media, that Iran was pressuring Russia, and other sources, to purchase a number of SA-10 batteries to modernize their air defense. Some reports indicated that Iran may have acquired a number of these systems by smuggling components from Russia, Croatia and Kazakhstan, but these reports seem unreliable. In March 2001 there were reports that the Russians are close to cutting a deal with Iran on advanced missiles. Itar-Tass reported that Iran would soon close the deal on the Russian Tor-M1, Tor-M1T, and the S-300 surface-to-air missiles. One unconfirmed intelligence news source claims that Iran has received at least two batteries of SA-10 (of the S-300PMU type) SAMs from Russia. According to this source these became operational in February 2003, and have been deployed in the Tehran area.

When deployed in an integrated network, an array of S-300 and TOR-M1 systems could pose a highly potent defensive network against any aggressor, with the long range S-300 neutralizing aggressors and support planes at the high altitude, long range domain while the TORs engaging UAVs, precision guided weapons, cruise missiles and anti-radiation missiles, launched at the the SAMs, radars and protected sites.

There only scanty reports over Iranian Key SAM-defended areas. Known locations include Tehran and the strategic military industrial centers. Iran appears to have deployed the SA-5 batteries to defend Tehran, major ports, and oil facilities, providing long-range medium-to-high altitude coverage of vital coastal installations. The Hawk and SA-2 batteries are reportedly located around Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Bandar Abbas, Kharg Island, Bushehr, Bandar Khomeini, Ahwaz, Dezful, Kermanshah, Hamadan, and Tabriz, providing point defense for key bases and facilities. Some of these sites lack sufficient missile launchers to be fully effective.

There have been limited attempts to locally design and produce indigenous air defense systems. One of these is the so-called 'Sayyad-1' missile. On 14 April 1999 the Iranian armed forces carried out a successful test of this locally made surface-to-air missile. A spokesman of the Iranian Ministry of Defense reports, "the missile was able to hit its target at an appropriate altitude." This missile was designated Sayyad-1, named for assassinated commander Lt-Gen. Ali Sayyad-Shirazi, the notorious “Butcher of Kurdistan”, who was killed by the Muhajedin opposition that year. Iranian defense ministry officials acknowledged that the Sayyad-1 missile was an SA-2 of Chinese design, but was at least partially manufactured in Iran. Chinese Aviation Industry Minister Zha Yuli was "on an official visit to the strategic Iranian town of Qeshm in Bushehr province" at the time the missile is test-fired. Chinese ambassador to Iran, Wang Shijie, accompanied him on the trip. Another report suggested that the Sayyad-1 medium to long range air defense missile was developed locally using elements of technologies of the Hawk and Standard missiles, Having upgraded the missile's warhead, the Iranians claimed that range was increased to 45-50 kilometers.

Another locally produced air defense system seems to be the Chinese origin Feimeng 80 air defense missile, a point defense weapon said to be deployed to defend military bases. The system comprises pedestal-mounted MANPADS, similar to the Boeing Avenger, and has been suggested as having potential to engage cruise missiles using an E/F-band acquisition radar and a J-band engagement radar. China first publicly displayed its mobile low-altitude and ultra-low-altitude missile "Feimeng-80 (Flying Midge) during official displays in the early 90's. The system uses a combination of infrared, TV and radar sensors, guiding the missile by radio command. This method enables the system to remain passive until the missile is launched. It is yet unclear weather the missile is produced locally by Iran or imported from China.

An improved version of the Feimeng-90 was fielded in 1998, introducing a new radar covering a range of 25,000 meters (compared to 18,400 of the previous model). Maximum speed of the missile has been increased from 750 m/sec. to 900 m/sec., and maximum range now from 12,000 meters to 15,000 meters.

Some reports indicate that China has modernized some of Iran's surveillance radars. Such radars produced by the China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation which can detect targets up to 300 km away could now be part of Iran's air defense system.

But even with these latest acquisitions, Iran's air defenses remained porous. An Operational assessment indicates that launchers are scattered too widely preventing rapid reaction and becoming vulnerable to enemy suppression. The current system lacks low altitude radar coverage, overlapping radar network, command and control integration, sensors, and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), all basic elements of modern, effective air defense network. The US has already mapped most of the Iranian defensive system, by playing a "can and mouse" game, penetrating the Iranian airspace with strike aircraft and UAVs, luring the air defense network to activate its sensors, revealing the "electronic Order of Battle (EOB), typical operational characteristics, placements of assets and concepts of operation. Iran may at best be able to field a limited point defense for its most vital objectives. The present deal for 29 TOR M-1 systems could partly enhance this deficiency, although, when integrated with high altitude interceptors, such stop-gap defenses could become quite effective even against a determined, well equipped offensive.

And this precisely presents the acute dilemma for Tehran’s efforts towards a viable air defense around its emerging nuclear site infrastructure. Nodal analysis provides one method of increasing the scope of an air campaign without increasing its size. The focus is on system criticality and vulnerability to attack. Striking only the most pivotal target systems requires precise intelligence, which is a crucial element in mounting such a critical attack. There are several such ‘node’ targets in Iran, according to intelligence analyst's estimate. A major location is the Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) conversion site at the Rudan Nuclear Research Center near Shiraz, which represents a primary target for counter-proliferation strikes. Another are the important Uranium enrichment facilities, a problematic target set within a large site at Natanz. Israel Military Intelligence refers to this site as "Kashan." Natanz is located between Isfahan and Kashan in central Iran. The facility is reportedly 100 miles north of Isfahan, and is located in old Kashan-Natanz, near a village called Deh-Zireh. A new site under construction and only recently detected by satellite, is the Ardekan Nuclear Fuel Unit. This site, reportedly scheduled to be completed in mid-2005, is located at the 33rd kilometer (20.5 miles) of the Ardekan - Choupanau Road. Another highly important target would be Isfahan said to be the primary location of the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The Nuclear Technology/Research Center in Isfahan is Iran's largest nuclear research center.

Operational Assessment
Iranian air defenses may have some potential to complicate western planning and distract effort on major targets, despite suffering from key weaknesses, but at its present strength the arsenal and infrastructure cannot really prevent a determined attack on its strategic target list.

The Achilles heel of the system remains its inability to generate effective real-time early warning and acting as a fully integrated system. The small number of surveillance radars could be engaged using PGM, or low-flying Tomahawk cruise missile strikes. Plenty of low-level approaches could be maintained along the ‘creases’ in the widely-spread air defense network caused by Iran’s mountainous terrain. The lack of centralized control and C4I network responsible for an overall national air defense could be exploited by deception and electronic warfare techniques. The bureaucratic harmony, as well as inter-service rivalry and distrust will only make things worse. Yet, the potential existence of two newly arrived batteries of Almaz S-300PMU, could dramatically change the situation and pose a significant challenge to any aggressor, especially if coordinated with low-altitude Tor systems functioning as "anti-PGM" elements.

Despite its obsolescence, Iran’s air defenses remain an unpredictable adversary. Despite its porosity, its SAM forces cover all altitudes, with mobile, rapidly deployable elements that could effectively evade preplanned attacks by Tomahawk missiles. Locally modified and improved systems could pose technical challenge to electronic warfare and countermeasures. The latest acquisition of the advanced TOR M-1 surface-to-air missiles, although insufficient to cover all key node targets of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure, could become a distinct problem due to their highly sophisticated technologies, still fully unacquainted to western intelligence.

Al-Ghajar Village Flashpoint

Hezbollah attacked close to 15:00 in the afternoon of 22 Nov 2005, when a heavy barrage of mortars and Kaytusha rockets bombarded IDF positions on Mount Dov, the village of Ghajar, and the surrounding area. But this time the IDF was ready. Its intelligence received warning of the Shi’ite guerilla plan to try and repeat the 2000 fiasco and kidnap soldiers along the border line.

The fire soon spread throughout the entire border region, with hundreds of Katyusha rockets, mortars and anti-tank missiles striking targets inside Israel. But when a group of motorized Hezbollah special forces infiltrated into Ghajar, a well placed Israeli ambush foiled the kidnapping attempt by killing the entire group.

Israel retaliated sharply.

Speaking shortly after Israeli fighter jets attacked Hezbollah command posts in south Lebanon, Defence Minister Mofaz described it as the largest-scale response since the IDF withdrawal five years ago. The Israeli retaliation was so fierce, that Lebanon officially intervened by requesting UNIFIL to mediate an immediate cease fire. Although official reports attempted to play down the scale, unofficial, but reliable intelligence sources have revealed that the air force has virtually destroyed the entire communication and forward intelligence network built by joint Iranian/Syrian and Hezbollah effort creating a sophisticated surveillance and monitoring infrastructure probing deep into the Israeli territory. This network, experts indicate, was constructed to support a future massive rocket offensive, when the time was ready to attack Israel, should the Jewish State, or for that matter, a joint effort led by the US, attempt to destroy the Iranian nuclear and missile infrastructure by military action. As repeated intelligence reports have warned, Hezbollah has built a massive arsenal of short-medium and long-range rockets, numbering several thousands placing within range major Israeli targets, threatening large population centers, including the strategic Haifa Bay.

Hezbolla’s offensive arsenal includes, among older 122mm Katyusha ( range 20km), 240mm Fajr-3, (range 40km )and Fajr-5, (range 72km) rockets and missiles. Updated intelligence reports mentioned that the Shi’te guerilla could be deploying a Syrian modified BM-27 220mm rocket carrying a 360kg warhead and that Iran may have stationed a battery of its Zelzal-2 artillery rocket in the Beka’a Valley, which with a range of 210km and payload of 600kg could cause devastating damage to Haifa Bay and its strategic harbour installations.

IDF Intelligence chief Major General Zeevi Farkash said last Wednesday that Syria and Iran have instigated the Ghajar flare-up to stave off international pressure on both nations. General Farkash told the Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee that Hezbollah had carefully planned the attack with strategic aims, hoping to draw the IDF to retaliate, when civilian targets were hit, and thus giving way to Hezbollah rocket attacks deep into Israeli territory escalating into a massive conflagration.

The Hezbollah special forces attack on al-Ghajar should rate particular attention due to its meticulous tactical planning. As mentioned, Hezbollah opened the attack by a massive rocket barrage along the entire front, which actually served as tactical distraction to allow their special forces mobile group infiltrate into the Israeli side of al-Ghajar village, with aim to capture an IDF outpost and take its occupants prisoner. The attempt was foiled, when the Israelis already withdrawn, in time, from their original post, position, from which the attackers were surprised by flanking fire, killing four, sending the rest scurrying to a nearby Hezbollah outpost, which was later destroyed by fighter jets.

The IDF commanding general Udi Adam said in his after action report, that “ it was the first time that Hezbollah used its entire tactical arsenal”, revealed that one of the Merkava tanks received no less than seven hits by Russian made anti-tank missiles, none of which penetrated its armour and all the crew escaped unhurt. According to intelligence reports, Hezbollah have recovered quickly from their fiasco at al-Ghajar.

Their Iranian instructors have taken this incident very seriousely and reacted by sending anti-armour specialists from Tehran to their training base located in the Lebanese Beka’a valley, which has become even more formative after the Syrian army withdrawal earlier this year. Unconfirmed reports indicate the arrival in Lebanon of the new Russian AT-14 Kornet anti-tank missile, or an Iranian version of the weapon, which is capable in penetrating advanced armour suites. Israeli tank experts have mentioned the Hezbollah video shots from the action at al-Ghajar, clearly displaying hits on the Merkava tank. They believe that Iranian instructors have carefully studied these displays by looking for “blind” spots in which Merkava could be vulnerable to Kornet fire.

Hezbollah tactics have become substantially refined over the years. From individual attacks on lone vehicles, night ambushes, and sporadic rocket attacks, the fighting in the south Lebanon security zone had escalated into highly skilled guerrilla operations, some of which have proved extremely successful against the Israeli Army. The Shi’ite guerillas became quite professional in using Russian anti-tank missiles against IDF Merkava Mk1 and Mk2 versions. In one incident, second generation AT-4 Spigot ATGM scored severn hits on one tank, but only one penetrated into a vulnerable ‘blind’spot killing the driver.

The IDF rallied quickly to the threat and upgraded its so-called ‘Batash’ Merkava with additional armor plating and also trained crews in the ‘Sagger Watch’ drill, a technique which envisages tanks operating in teams. Each team member searches key points in the terrain to locate enemy ATGM teams hiding out. If an area is suspected, it is covered by main gun, machine gun, or onboard mortar fire, or blinded by smoke. The watching vehicle will give warning to the rest of the team, which opens fire in that direction. When a Sagger ( or other wire guided ATGM) is spotted in flight, the tank fires in the direction of the launcher, hoping to distract the enemy gunner’s concentration during the critical navigation phase, or obscure his vision by smoke.

The village of al-Ghajar, where the main action took place, has become the most dangerous flashpoint along the volatile Israel-Lebanese border is one of those enigmatic political curiosities, which unfortunately occur when short-sighted decisions are made on crucial geo-political arrangements. When the IDF withdrew, in compliance with UN Resolutions 425, from its self-declared “Security Zone” in south Lebanon in May 2000 it left some severe topographical constraints, creating flashpoints for future confrontation with Hezbollah. The Shi’ite militia took over the void, pending refusal by Lebanon, under Syrian pressure, to deploy its armed forces along the international border and restore its sovereignty in south Lebanon.

Disregarding vehement Israeli objections, the UN officials decided creating the so-called ‘Blue Line’, insisting that this was a temporary measure, due to Beirut’s refusal to co-operate in designating the “real” international border, which itself was a historical farce made by the post- WW1 colonial powers.

Populated by Alawites, a strange anomaly in this mostly Shi’ite region, al-Ghajar is situated at a highly strategic location along the Israel-Lebanese border. On the banks of Hasbani river and alongside the Wassani springs, important water reservoirs for both Lebanon and Israel alike, it was captured during the 1967 war by Israel and its residents have voted for Israeli citizenship.

When the UN surveyors probed the area, they depicted al-Ghajar as “two thirds inside Lebanon and one third within the Israeli occupied Syria”, which immediately provoked angry demonstrations by the villagers. Since Israel’s withdrawal five years ago, al-Ghajar remains divided, despite the clamour of its residents.

Hezbollah has shrewdly exploited the situation, by dominating the Lebanese part, which placed its guerillas within feet of the IDF position in Israel’s part of the village- a deadly combination.

There is may be a ray of hope, which could eventually solve this perilous condition. Following growing pressure by the United States, the traditionally anti-Israel, UN Security Council issued, for the first time in its history, a stern reprimand over Hezbollah’s unprovoked attack. It was surprisingly reached unanimously by all attending members including Algeria. This new trend and continued pressure on Syria and Iran, could perhaps indicate new calls to dismantle the Shi’ite militia according to US Security Council Resolution 1559 and encourage the Beirut government to deploy its forces along the international border, putting an end to the notorious Hezbollaland in south Lebanon.

Syrian Ambitions to develop a Strategic Missile Potential

Israeli intelligence reports quoted by western sources revealed Sunday, December 4, 2005 that Syria has introduced significant changes in the advanced model of the Scud D missile to improve its guidance and accuracy.

The evaluations were based on an examination of pieces of a Scud D missile that went off course after a test launch and landed in southern Turkey. Although the launch took place a few months ago, it took some time to evaluate the debris to establish technical details on the missile. Two of the three Syrian missiles, which were launched from a site north of Haleb, were of the advanced D model, which has a range of 650 kilometers.

According to western experts, who examined the missile parts found, the warhead of the Scud D separates from its body on its way to the target. Course deviations in the warhead can be corrected with the addition of small wings of the same type found on SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, making the improved Scud much more accurate and allowing it to be aimed at smaller targets.

Although this years Scud-D launch was not the first, it may nevertheless underscore the strategic importance that Syrian decision-makers attribute to medium-range ballistic missiles as a viable deterrent against Israel’s military supremacy.

The Syrian Missile Development Program
For several decades, Israeli intelligence have monitored Syria's clandestine efforts to reachstrategic parity with Israel's military potential. Fully aware of Israel's unchallenged air superiority, Syria opted for missiles, but while these could reach into Israel, strategic effect could only be achieved by weapons of mass destruction, arming ballistic missile warheads. Realistic assessment ruled out Syria's potential in developing nuclear capability in forseen time, and although efforts were made to develop bio-weapons, Syria's national emphasis during the last two decades has been devoted to chemical weapons.

The first to start this trend, was Abdullah Watiq Shahid, a nuclear physicist, who founded the government funded Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in 1971, ostensibly a civilian science agency, but soon operating under the cloak of high secrecy in developing weaponised chemical substances. The first facility, which started producing such material was named the Borosilicate Glass Project, established with aid from a German company. The facility produced dual-purpose chemicals, such as dichloro ( 2- chlorovinyl) arsine, a substance which is the main source of the GB Sarin-A nerve agent. Another company named Setma sprung up in the outskirts of Damascus, which imported trimethyl phosphate from India, under the pretense to produce organophosphate insecticide for Syrian agriculture purposes. This substance, experts know, is a precursor for the weaponisation of nerve agents.

A more ambitious program was started during the eighties, when Syria's military patrons, the Soviet Union rendered vital information over the production process of advanced chemical warfare weapons. This brought about the development of aerial bombs containing binary sarin gas. On 23 September 2000, then IDF Chief of Staff General Shaul Mofaz revealed, that Arrow's highly sophisticated long-range radar system Green Pine detected the launch of a Syrian Scud-D missile from its base outside Halab in northern Syria, tracking its full trajectory until its impact point, some 700km in the southern desert.

The Scud-D, formerly known as the SS-1E in the Soviet Union missile arsenal, was developed from the Scud-C (SS-1D), with a reduced warhead which separates from the motor and fuel tank assembly following burnout phase. The original idea was to enhance accuracy on impact to around 50m Circulat Error of Probability (CEP), using stabilisation and guidance computer, to refine the aim point as the missile approaches its target. According to western intelligence reports, Syria has received deliveries from North Korea which included modified Scud-D type missiles (Nodong).For several years, Syria has been trying to increase the range of its missile arsenal, so that they could reach all targets within Israel, including the highly sensitive Dimona nuclear reactor site, which was out of range to the Scud-B and Scud-C ballistic missiles, the bulk of Syria's strategic missile arsenal.

But not only increasing missile range was in Syria's interest: to achieve solid fuel missile technology became a prime issue.

As the development of VX entered production capability, the Syrians modified their new Scud-C missile. The warhead of the missile underwent experimental adaptation to carry the large nozzles and dispersal mechanism required for chemical warfare agents, especially to spray a persistant agent such as VX, which has to be dispersed at certain altitudes to be effective over the target area. Intelligence sources estimate that at least one Scud-C missile tipped VX agent test firing took place near Damascus in May 1998.

The bulk of Syria's missile arsenal comprised of liquid fuel weapons, which require not only substantial time for the launch preparation, but highly hazardous handling of the toxic fuel substance during the process. This can last up to 90 minutes, giving adequate time for detection and attack while the missile is still on its Transporter Elevator Launcher vehicle (TEL), and thus prone to destruction ( especially lethal to handlers if mounting chemical or biological warheads!). By using solid fuel propellants, the missile can be launched from underground silos, or by quickly moving the TEL out of the bunker to a pre-surveyed site close by and fire.

Syrian Missile Deployment
The Syrian Missile Command is located in Aleppo and controls three mobile- surface-to-surface missile brigades, each with one FROG-7 battalion, one SS-21 Scarab and one SS-1 Scud-B battalion. According to Israeli sources at least two brigades were deployed south towards Damascus in July 2001 wether they returned to their permanent locations since, is unknown.
The Scud-C/D units do not come under command of the Aleppo Corps structure, but are maintained as strategic element with first strike capability under direct command of the presidential palace in Damascus. Syria has two large underground missile production and maintenance facilities near Aleppo and Hamah.

Though the bulk of the Syrian missile arsenal contains conventional explosive warheads intelligence sources estimate that at least 150 warheads have been modified to include non-conventional weapons, but these would be used only under the most extreme circumstances.
A major, highly secret production VX facility has ben identified in an isolated location north of Damascus, other plants may be dispersed for safety, carefully camouflaged near Hama and Homs. This last one is at the huge Al-Safir complex, which was photographed by satellite last July. (the entire satellite photo series can be viewed at: the Global-Security website).
Ronen Bergman described the complex in his article, engaging experts identify the various sites, such as special cooling towers, typical in chemical production facilities. The satellite pictures clearly indicate huge exit doors to underground tunnels, allowing the giant Russian-made MAZ-543 missile launcher vehicles to move in and out fast.

Ahmadinejad Statement: ‘Clear and Present Danger'

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad shocked the world when he called for Israel to be "wiped off the map." World reaction was prompt. But Iran insists. Just how much of a threat does the Iranian leadership pose to Israel and the world?

In an Oct. 26 speech at a conference in Tehran, Admadinejad reportedly expressed a wish that Israel be destroyed, quoting the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s comment: “Israel must be wiped off the map.”

It is possible to dismiss Ahmadinejad's words by saying that there is nothing new in them, and that the entire world knows that Iran elected an extremist president who is a direct heir of Ayatollah Khomeini. But it seems that conventional response to these statements calling for Israel’s liquidation could encourage others to make light of Iran's ability to carry out its threat. This is doubly true with regard to a president who insists on his country's right to enrich uranium and expects the world to believe that Iran has no intention of arming itself with nuclear weapons. In fact, the words of the Iranian president seem especially sinister in light of Iran's relentless ambition to develop nuclear arms and long-range delivery platforms. Indeed, less than three months on the job, Iran's zealous president made several highly controversial diplomatic gaffes, his latest, certainly his strangest faux pas, if it was one.

"There is no doubt that the new wave of attacks in Palestine will wipe off this stigma Israel from the face of the Islamic world " urged the Iranian president to his followers gathering in Tehran in demonstrations are being held as part of annual Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Day protests. In weird coincidence, his fiery rhetoric backlashed only hours later when disrupting a short period of calm, a Palestinian suicide bomber slipped into a line at a fast food stand and blew himself up in a crowded outdoor market in the northern Israeli town of Hadera, killing five and critically wounding scores of other civilians. Israeli officials responded: “Iran is a clear and present danger”.

Iran has supported several violent Palestinian groups, especially the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which claimed responsibility for the Hadera blast, saying it was revenge for Israel's killing on its West Bank leader Luay Saadi. The State Department's office of counter-terrorism in its report on international terrorism clearly established that the Palestinian Islamic Jihad receives funding from Iran.

Non-proliferation experts expected Iran is to be cautious wanting to get through the November 24 board of governors' meeting of the UN watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA. In a resolution on September 24, the Vienna-based IAEA threatened to refer Tehran to the UN Security Council over its nuclear program, which the United States claims is a cover for weapons development.

Their assessments backfired last Wednesday, when Ahmadinejad's outspoken performance last Wednesday placed Iran firmly on the path of confrontation with most of the Free World. "The danger of such a radical statesman is that by knotting religious beliefs with the nuclear issue, it makes for an explosive issue that will detonate in the face of all Iranians," an Iranian analyst told Asia Times Online (ATO).

Leading Middle East experts are finding difficulty in explaining Ahmadinejad’s bizarre statements and especially its timing, which must bear rather unfortunate on Iran’s international standing. The populist leader's comments, reported by the state-run media, come at a time when Tehran is already under considerable pressure over its suspect nuclear weapons ambitions and alleged involvement in attacks on British troops in Iraq. One theory regards Syria’s internal dissension starting to spill over into neighbouring Iran, which has maintained close ties to Syria since the return to Iran of the late Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. Both nations under considerable stress could be trying to close ranks against future American led pressure. In fact, Syria’s president Bashar Assad has taken a similar trend some weeks ago, urging Palestinian guerillas to increase their attacks on Israel.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a veteran of Iran's hardline Revolutionary Guards, took office last August after scoring a landslide win in a June presidential election. A virtual nobody on Iran’s national scene, Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 49, was picked by Iran’s radical Islamic leaders and swung ahead of the presidential race to deal “the heaviest psychological blow to Iran’s enemies.” His tone represents a major change from that of former president Hojjatoselam Seyyed Mohammad Khatami , whose favoured topic was "dialogue among civilisations" and who led an effort to improve Iran's relations with the West.

Mr. Ahmadinejad has kept a tough stance against attempts to limit Iranian nuclear technology. Soon after he took office in June, Iran resumed the processing of uranium, in defiance of the United Nations. In an unyielding address before the United Nations General Assembly last September, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rebuffed attempts to rein in his country's nuclear program, railing against the United States as an aggressor and restating a compromise proposal that had already been rejected. But there are already first signs that the clerics are being concerned with their new protegee’s radical attitude. "It is exactly for this reason that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, realizing his mistake in promoting Ahmadinejad, placed the pragmatic and experienced Hashemi Rafsanjani above him in order to repair the damage the new, inexperienced but zealot Muslim might cause to the regime”, an Iranian analyst wrote in ATO. He was referring to the recent decision by Khamenei to transfer some of his immense and unlimited power to the Assembly of Discerning the Interests of the State (ADIS, or Expediency Council), which is headed by Rafsanjani. According to a new regulation, the ADIS will have the power to supervise the regime's macro-policies and long-term plans and projects, a power that had belonged to the Supreme Leader. This means that all the theocratic regime's three powers - legislative, judicial and executive - must submit their planning and policies to the 32-member, leader-controlled ADIS for approval before implementation. Until this change, ADIS's main role was to mediate between the Council of the Guardians (CG) and the majlis, or parliament, as the 12-member, leader-controlled CG is in charge of both vetting all candidates in all elections and making sure that laws passed by the majlis are in conformity with Sharia law. The increased powers given to ADIS could be interpreted as a clear warning to Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guards who provided him with millions of votes, against trying to wrest any powers from the clerical establishment.

Meanwhile the Western powers are taking a fierce attitude in response to Ahmadinejad’s unprecedented unrestrained rhetoric. The US said the president's remarks proved the accuracy of Washington's fears. "I think it reconfirms what we have been saying about the regime. It underscores the concerns we have about Iran's nuclear intentions," Scott McClellan, the White House press secretary, said. Mark Regev, an Israeli foreign ministry spokesman, said: "Unfortunately this is not the first time that we've heard such an extremist message from the Iranian leadership. I think there is a growing understanding in the international community that the regime is not Israel's problem alone, but a problem the entire international community must grapple with." Israel views Iran as its main security threat in the Middle East. Defence minister, Shaul Mofaz, has said Tehran could be capable of developing a nuclear weapon within months and that there is a need for urgent action to prevent that. He said the Iranian comments gave Israel justification for urging the world to take a tougher stand against Iran and refer its nuclear programme to the UN Security Council. Prime minister Ariel Sharon said Todday, (December 1st) that Israel is making all necessary preparations to handle such a situation; warning that a nuclear Iran poses also threat to Arab world and other western countries. Israel has already issued thinly veiled threats against Iran's nuclear programme if diplomatic efforts should fail and is buying 500 "bunker-buster" bombs from the US for its long range fighter-bombers that could be used to destroy underground facilities. IDF Intelligence Chief speaking at the Knesset Foreign& Security Committee, assessed that by next April, if not stopped by energic action, Iran could achieve a nuclear option through a point-of-no-return time table.

Thus, after all is said and done, if there is a silver lining in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's warning , it is that it will be more difficult for people in the West, especially in Europe, to delude themselves into thinking they are dealing with so-called pragmatists or reformers who want to end the clerical dictatorship that has brutalized the Iranian people.

In the words of one commentator: "Can you imagine a state like that with an attitude like that having a nuclear weapon?"

Should Israel afford a professional Army?

From the beginning, in 1948, David ben Gurion’s idea of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF- Zahal) was that everyone would serve men and women, young and old, secular and religious with few exceptions. A new, besieged and outnumbered country would safeguard itself with a universal draft and a reserve system that would keep citizens in uniform well into middle age. The military would be the common denominator in a society of disparate immigrant groups. The entire nation would be the army and the army would loyally serve the nation. It was a romantic notion, one that added to the mystique of the IDF. In fact, however it soon turned out that the “people's army” was always something of a misnomer.

Israel’s Arab citizens, who today make up 18% of the population, have always been exempt. So are ultra-Orthodox Yeshiva (Judaic Talmudic school) students, according to a decree made in 1948. Although yeshiva students in Israel are exempt from military service, students who attend, what are known as hesder yeshivot, voluntarily serve in the IDF. The word “hesder" translates as agreement, and both the State of Israel and its armed forces have agreed to permit the yeshivot to send their religious Zionist students for training and service as self-contained military units. Due to their high motivation, “hesder”soldiers mostly serve in elite combat units and are legendary for their bravery in battle. But the IDF command became extremely concerned about pullout-related insubordination among religious soldiers from hesder yeshivas, and particularly among lower echelon commanders. One brigade commander, for instance, begged his superiors not to put hesder students in his brigade anymore, saying that he does not want soldiers who obey their rabbis rather than their commanders.

Matters deteriorated further, when leading rabbis urged their former students to disobey orders related to, what they considered, political decisions. Outstanding was the declaration by Rabbi Avraham Shapira to refuse orders to evacuate Jewish settlements in Gaza. Rabbi Shapira has direct influence over the position of hundreds of religious conscripts and reservists.
Following several incidents of mission refusals, by either right or left motivated draftees, the IDF came to the conclusion that it could not rely entirely on its national servicemen for the Gaza disengagement mission. Moreover, facing the concern, that mental strain and psychological backlog on young draftees, could turn out extremely dangerous, with long-term stress situations, affecting their mandatory service term. After lengthy deliberations therefore, the IDF and Police commands, decided to form special units, on temporary basis, for this extraordinary task, placed by the democratically elected leadership.

The resulting ad-hoc disengagement force was formed out of more mature personnel, recruited from rear area units, all regular servicemen, mostly with families. Special care was taken to select those known as secular, or moderately religious, but recognized as loyal and reliable, free from the negative influence of extremist rabbis. These ad-hoc units were, of course, only a temporary solution for an outstanding mission, and accordingly, the price was substantial. For several months, during which these non-combat troops underwent special training, rear area logistical bases became virtually freezed and in an emergency, this could have had serious consequences for IDF combat readiness. Fortunately this did not happen. The after-action lessons must be, that in future a more effective solution should be reached in order to enable Israel’s security forces to implement political decisions, in future, without disrupting the entire infrastructure for a single, even if temporary mission of national importance.

The refusal problem does not only affect right wing religious, but also left oriented servicemen. In 2003, then commander of the Israeli air force, General Dan Halutz ( presently IDF chief of staff), suspended nine active pilots who signed the well publicized "pilots' letter" asking to be exempt from further flights against civilians in Gaza. In June that same year, three young ‘refuseniks’ delivered a stirring detailed anti-occupation testimony of a kind never before heard in an Israeli military court. It is clear that army would prefer that prisoners of conscience opt for a psychological discharge, instead of fighting for their ideological principles. This hitherto totally unprecedented phenomenon,could send a warning signal to the authorities, that some comprehensive soul searching is urgently required to set a new national agenda for mandatory military service.

The Gaza disengagement has been hugely controversial within Israel. In particular, the government's decision to use the army to carry out the forced removal of Jewish settlers from the area. This move has threatened to split Israeli society over the political issue.

For decades the understandable tendency to write up the virtues of the IDF's militia-type structure has distracted public attention from the tactical conditions that have facilitated its success. Considering the disadvantageous conditions under which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) entered theso-called 1973 Yom Kippur war, its ultimate achievements were outstanding. Of the several factors which turned the tide, undoubtedly the most significant was the heroic performance of the IDF's reservists. Pitched into combat at literally a moment's notice, Israel's citizen-soldiers saved the country from military humiliation. That accomplishment exerted a profound effect on Israeli strategic planning. Although in later years, this conclusion came to be questioned, the performance of the IDF reservists in 1973 was considered at the time to be a vindication of the IDF's force structure as a whole. Hence, whereas several other dimensions of Israeli security thinking were subsequently reviewed and in some cases revised, the IDF's retention of its traditional framework of military service was not affected.

Under the present circumstances, institutionalizing the strategic planning process would have significant advantage: it might compel Israel's security community, as well as the larger Israeli public, to come to terms with a fact that is well known but rarely discussed: the need to change the nature of Israel’s armed forces.

Future battlefield scenarios, which Israel will have to face, on the ground as well as in the air and at sea, are being transformed by exponential advances in the production of "smart" weapons and by the high-technology nature of modern, computerized systems of command, control, communications, and intelligence. Referred to in the aggregate as the "revolution in military affairs," these changes call not only for the acquisition of a more advanced arsenal; they also require the development of a different caliber of soldier—one who has undergone the lengthy and intensive training necessary to become expert in the . maintenance and realization of complex battle-platforms.

Can relatively short-term conscripts, even well-educated ones, acquire the needed skills? Can part-time reservists be relied upon to conserve their skills under conditions of accelerated technological change? In short, do not present conditions mandate a shift to a more professional force, principally, if not entirely, composed of career personnel? While one school of thought in Israel preaches the advantages of an all-volunteer professional force, other voices warn of its risks. But there are other issues involved, which may have a considerable bearing on any future decision. A significant factor revealed following the latest experiences in Gaza, is that the religious sector is unreliable to implement political decisions by a democratic elected government. Unfortunately, the fact is that in the coming years this very sector will become the mainstream of IDF command and its combat units. Nearly forty percent of the present officer candidates are already “hesder” Yeshiva graduates.

In Israel’s society, the IDF remained (until the disengagement from Gaza) the only concensus among the public, which is deeply divided between left and right, religious and secular, ashkenazi and oriental, black and white etc. To abolish mandatory service would eliminate this sole remaining national asset to which all Israel has continually looked up to. Whatever the decision, it will certainly become a very painful aspect in Israel’s society.