IAF Investigates Cause of Israeli AH-64 Helicopter Losses

Updated Aug. 10, 2006:

An Israel AIr Force (IAF) AH-64D Longbow (IDF designation: Saraf) helicopter was lost on July 24, 2006 close to the Israeli-Lebanese border while on a combat mission. Immediately after the event the IAF ruled out the possibility that the helicopter was hit by Hezbollah surface-to-air missiles. If it was not suffered due to hostile action, what was the cause of this event?

The helicopter was on a combat mission, was Number 2 of a two ship team, supporting IDF ground operations in Lebanon. The helicopter was flown by Lt. Tom Farkash and Col. Zvi Loft. When hit the helicopter was loitering at an altitude of 8,000 feet, observing the targets engaged by the team leader. The Israel Air Force (IAF) is considering one of two possibilities which could have caused the accident.

1. The possibility of technical failure in a critical component of the rotor hub:
In a rare video record of the crash, the rotor can clearly be seen separated from the fuselage, while still in the air. The helicopter recently went through repairs, implementing manufacturer's mandated technical fixes. Accordingto Israel Channel 2 news, Boeing sent a a technical team to Israel to assist in the investigation. It is unclear why such a failure occured (if indeed this was the reason for the loss) since these AH-64D have logged only few hundred flight hours. Following this event, the IAF grounded all its AH-64s, and after replacing the suspected faulty component, returned them to operational status.

2. Mid-air collision with a rocket:
Few days after the event, the IAF published its preliminary findings, according to which the accident was caused by mid-air collision with an M-28 rocket, fired by a nearby Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) unit (IDF Designation: Menatez).

Sources at the IDF Artillery corps rebuffed these findings claiming that MLRS doesn't reach these altitudes, but the ballistic algorithms calculations clearly indicate that M-26 rockets can reach an altitude of 1 - 2 km when fired at lower trajectory to ranges of about 20 km and further. However, it is unclear if the rockets actualy reach this height at the location where the accident occured.

This leads us to a discussion of a different topic.

The management of low level airspace is recognized as a problematic issue by modern forces which employed high intensity warfare in recent years. The airspace at these altitudes is filled with activity, not only by helicopters and UAVs but also by air defense missiles, gun, rockets and artillery. The US Army operates a Divisional Airspace Management Element (DAME), supervising all relevant activity (helicopters, UAVs, air defense, rockets and artillery), allocating safe areas for the operations of manned assets, including aircraft and helicopters and de-conflicting airspace usage. Even these were not sufficient; in 2005 the US Army began to operate smaller six-men teams attached to brigade combat teams, to manage the brigade's airspace, after mini UAVs collided with helicopters. Similar events were experienced in Afghanistan as well.

In Israel, the IAF has total control of all non-civilian airspace, including all relevant assets, such as aircraft, helicopters, UAVs and air defense systems. However, the IAF does not control the IDF's artillery and rockets, neither the Navy's shipborn air defense systems (Phalanx and Barak). Since both services did not employ their systems extensively to realize the need to change control authority, erroneous procedures seeped into their routines. One such procedure nearly caused the loss of the Israeli Naval Ship Hanit to the Chinese made C-802 missile, as the Israeli didn't activate its air defense weapons and active EW, to avoid potential risk of fratricide. The Israeli Navy considered the ship's position, some 16 km off the Lebanese coast as "safe" from coastal threats. They were not prepared for the long range missile in the theater. Both events could be avoided, have the IAF, Israel Navy and Ground Forces Command establish better "joint" operations framework, which will enable these forces not only to fight for a common cause, but also to safely and effectively operate together.

Israelis use Fuel-Air Explosives for IED and mine clearing in Lebanon

Updated: August 2, 2006

In recent days Israel employed fuel-air explosives to clear areas suspected to be planted with IEDs and mines placed by Hezbullah in South Lebanon. The fuel-air countermine called Carpet is built by RAFAEL and is employed by the Israeli corps of engineers. The Carpet uses small rockets fired from a stand-off range, deploying highly explosive aerosol over the suspected area. The explosion of this mixture develops high pressure impulse which effectively 'kills' fuzes or sets up explosive devices in the affected area.

During the IDF incursions along the Lebanese border, Israeli combat engineers used Carpet rockets against enemy vehicles, hitting two Hezbullah troop carriers by accurately employing the rockets from a stand-off range, effectively turning the Carpet carrying Puma AIFV into a Multi-Purpose Vehicle System (more info).

Summary of Israeli Air Force Strikes -12-21 July 2006

Updated: July 21, 2006:

Airpower, missiles and rockets are extensively used by all sides fighting the current Middle East, with Israel using its airpower, the Lebanese Hezbollah using its extensive rocket and missiles force and even the Palestinians in Gaza, continue to use their improvised Qassam rockets to pound Israel’s southern cities.

Some of the recent operations were listed at the official IAF website.

The Israeli Air Force flew over 2,000 combat sorties against some 1,000 targets since the beginning of the hostilities in the north. UAVs performed over 250 UAV sorties. It began its strikes on Lebanon with the destruction of roads and bridges and closure of all Lebanese airfields, closing the runways of the civilian and military airfields, in an attempt to prevent Iranian and Syrian weapons resupplies to the Hezbollah. Attacks were conducted on the ports, as well as coastal radar stations. As part of the isolation of the theater of operation, Israeli F-16Ds from 109th and 101st squadrons performed interdiction missions, targeting with smart weapons critical passes and vehicles moving along the Beirut - Damascus highway and Daher-al-Baidar passage, the routes linking Lebanon to the east. F-16s C/D from 105th (Scorpions) squadron conducted strikes against weapons storage facilities at Baal-Beck in Northern Lebanon, located in an area previously considered “secured” from Israeli attacks, as it resides within the coverage of Syrian air defense systems. Later, a team of AH-64D Longbow attack helicopters from 113 squadron (Hornets) set the fuel tanks of the Beirut international airport ablaze. Throughout the attacks, UAVs are monitoring the area for hours, providing persistent intelligence and battle-damage assessment to the Israeli air command. Two attacks were directed against Hezbollah headquarters, these were conducted by Israeli F-15Is of 69 “Hammers” squadron pounded Hezbollah headquarters located in an 11 floor building at the Al-Dahia, a southern suburb of Beirut.

Airpower is also used for psychological warfare operations (PSYOPS), by warning civilian population to clear the area preceding attacks, the Israelis are trying to reduce loss of civilian lives. Such activities dictated a slower operational tempo, which provided Hezbollah leaders ample time to take cover and prepare for the attacks. These operations resulted in the evacuation of by 60,000 civilians from 28 villages targeted by the Israelis as Hezbollah strongholds. However, given the ferocious nature of these attacks casualties are mounting on both sides. In parallel, the IAF is conducting persistent surveillance of South Lebanon, in an attempt to pre-empt rocket strikes. These tasks are extremely difficult due to the illusive nature of these mobile weapons, which have been pre-positioned in hidden storage facilities, waiting for this showdown. Hezbollah rockets were “embedded” inside civilian homes, hidden inside specially erected ground and underground levels. Examples to such concealments were secondary explosions experienced during IAF attacks of farmhouses, expplosions that are evident of the existence of explosives in these supposedly innocent locations. Some of these activities were monitored throughout the years by Israeli UAVs, and this intelligence provided important, pinpointed targeting for preemptive strikes.

After completing the "shaping of theater", resulting in part of the civilian population fleeing the area, Israeli strike fighters and combat helicopters began a systematic search and destroy operation, seeking rocket storage and launching sites, as well as hunting Hezbollah activists. As part of these activities the IAF is attacking vehicles suspected to be employed by Hezbollah weapon systems. Since these vehicles do not have distinct shapes or signature, the chances for mistakes are high. Nevertheless, civilian road mobility has been decimated dramatically since the beginning of the hostilities, due to IAF attacks against road facilities and gas stations. Furthermore, movement of civilian vehicles is gernerally from the targeted zones outside, while incoming traffic is becoming susceptible to potential Israeli attacks. The Israelis are warning the Lebanese not to move in trucks or pickup trucks in the South, as these vehicles will be targeted as Hezbollah transports.

According to the Lebanese newspaper daily Star, Israeli aircraft attacked two of the main bridges at the southern entrance of Beirut, Hadi Nasrallah and Sultan Ibrahim, close to the heavily guarded Iranian Embassy compound. Earlier attacks had set fire to two fuel depots at the Jiyye plant and state-run Electricity du Liban. Other attacks targeted high-voltage electricity lines in Tyre, damaging power plants in Zahrani, Zouk and Deir Ammar, causing complete blackout in Beirut. The power station at Jamhur, east of Beirut was attacked on the night of July 17th. Gas stations along the routes were also destroyed. Air raids also hit several mobile-phone relays across the country. Following the C-802 missile attack on the Israeli corvette, the Israeli Navy and Air Force attacked and destroyed all (3) coastal radar sites along the Lebanese coastline, to prevent repeated attacks. Another radar station at a-Nazariya was destroyed the following night. The Israelis temporarily suspended their attacks on the ports to enable evacuation of foreigners from Lebanon. The IAF also confirmed Hezbollah fired Very Short Range Air Defense (VSHORAD) missiles against IAF helicopters, but no damage was reported. On the night of the 17th, and the morning of July 18th, several bases of the Lebanese army around the city of Tyre were attacked. The IAF reduced the pace of attacks, and shifted most of the activity to southern Lebanon and the Bekaa, to enable safe evacuation of foreign citizens from Lebanon.

On 18th July the IAF launched 250 sorties, against 100 targets; 20 of them attacked overnight. Among the targets were a launch facility of another Zilzal long range missile, Hezbollah facilities near the city of Tyre and logistics facilities in the Bekaa valley. A first Zilzal was hit two days ago, as it was transported near beirut.

The following day the the IAF performed 200 sorties ove Lebanon, revisiting the Beirut international airport and El-Manar TV station. In southern Beirut and the Bekaa valley the IAF attacked suspected command and control facilities, storage facilities and rocket launchers. Overnight, the IAF attempted to strike the Hezbollah leadership, attacking five buildings where the Israelis suspected the enemy leaders are grouping. Despite the wide devastation caused by the attack, Hezbollah claimed that their leaders were unharmed. To prove their claim, Hassan Nassarallah the Hezbollah leader gave an interview to el-Jazeera TV network. Other sorties, targeted against road infrastructure aimed to disrupt transportation and ressuply to the South.

On July 20th IAF performed 150 sorties, attacking 100 targets (40 of them at night). Among the targets were command locations, Other targets attacked that day included five rocket launchers, a suspected Fajr-3 medium range missile launcher and suspected vehicles, three storage facilities and roads. During the night the IAF conducted intensive helicopters operations, in support of ground operations in South Lebanon. As part of these ioperations, the IAF lost one aircre member and suffered three wounded, as two AH-64As (peten) collided and crashed when flying over Israeli territory.

On Friday, July 21 the IAF continued to strike transport activity along the Beirut Damascus highway. According to the During Lebanese newspaper Daily Star, the IAF finally succeeded to topple the Mdeirij bridge, part of the main Beirut-Damascus highway, which was repeatedly attacked since the breaing of the hostilities, on July 12. According to the Lebanese source, the IAF also attackled targets in the Shouf mountains, the refugee camp at Nueimah and the sea port village Damour, south of Beirut. Other targets includes were directed at Hizbollah facilities in the city of Baal-Beck in the north and Tyre in the south.

These operations are conducted in parallel to the activities over the southern theater, the Gaza Strip, where Israeli ground, naval and air forces are targeting Palestinian improvised rocket launcher teams and terrorist activities in the Gaza strip. On Sunday, the IAF attacked, for the third time, a tunnel prepared by Palestinians for underground infiltration into Israel beneath the Israeli - Palestinian border. With the availability of more material, Defense Update will soon initiate a separate log, covering air and ground operations in Gaza.

The current conflict began three weeks ago, when Palestinians infiltrated through a similar tunnel, killing two soldiers and abducting a third soldier.

Iranian Support for Hizbolla

Updated July 18, 2006

Israel blamed Iran to be directly involved in the attack on the Israel Navy Hanit, Saar V Class corvette. An Israeli military intelligence official has also alleged that around 100 members of Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards were in Lebanon, acting as military advisors to Hezbollah.

According to an interview with an unnamed Iranian official, published in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat arabic newspaper, since 1992, the Iranian revolutionary guards established 20 fixed rocket facilities, in the Bekaa valley in East Lebanon and along the southern border with Israel. They positioned 11,500 rockets and missiles, from the 107mm Grad and 122mm Katyusha rockets, capable of attacking targets at a range of 20 km, a Syrian made 220mm rocket, the Fajr 3 (240mm) also called Raad, and Fajr 5, (330mm, 70 km range) also known as Khaibar 1 or Iran. The Shahin (Zilzal) missiles have a range 110 - 150 km. In total, over 40 types of rockets and missiles were delivered to Lebanon, including the latest Iranian anti-ship missile, C-802 and surface to air missiles. One of the new types unveiled in this conflict was the Raad missile a 333mm rocket (shorter than the “Iran”), a "beefed-up" Grad rocket carrying up to 100 kg warhead to a range of 35-40 km. Hezbollah has three types of Raad missiles, which could represent various weight/range configurations enabling flexible positioning and engagement of long range targets further deep within Lebanese area, far from the Israel-Labanon border. These rockets were probably the types hitting the Haifa Bay industrial area and cities of Haifa, Acre and Tiberias during the weekend. According to Israeli sources, Hezbollah is being resupplied directly from Syrian army stocks, particularly 220mm Katyusha rockets. The Israelis attacked over 180 launch and storage facilities since the beginning of the hostilities in Lebanon, last Week.

The revolutionary guards established the first Hizbollah rocket unit in 1985, when, at the peak of their activity, over 2,000 Iranian instructors were active in Lebanon, training the Hizbollah guerillas. After the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990, the Iranians shifted this activity back to Iran where they trained so far over 3,000 lebanese guerillas. These courses included artillery, rocket and missile warfare, use of unmanned and unpowered aircraft, and various aspects of naval guerilla warfare.

INS Hanit Suffers Iranian Missile Attack

Updated: July 17, 2006:

According to Israel Defense Forces (IDF) sources, the attack was conducted by Chinese C-802. Apparently, two missiles were launched toward the Israel Navy Ship (INS) Hanit (Spear), SAAR V class corvette patrolling the Lebanese coast 16 kilometers from the shore. The attack was a coordinated, simultaneous “high/low” attack - the first “high” missile passed over the Israeli ship. Missing the target, it continued flying, hitting and sinking a civilian Egyptian ship cruising 60 kilometers from the shore. The second missile followed a sea-skimming flight profile hitting the Israeli vessel at the stern, killing four sailors and setting the flight deck on fire and crippling the propulsion systems inside the hull. Surviving the potentially devastating attack INS Hanit returned to Ashdod naval base for repairs.

The simultaneous attack was probably using two techniques as well, ensuring maximum chances of success. The Israeli Navy believes the missiles used targeing data from Lebanese coastal radars, therefore maintaining low electro-magnetic signature throughout the attack prparation phase. The first missiles was apparently used as a radar-guided “bait”. seducing the ship to deploy its defensive systems against it, focusing all the attention on the “obvious” threat while the second sea-skimming missile closing below. A supporting fact for this assumption is the fact that the first missile locked on the unfortunate Egyptian ship 44 kilometers away, as it was the next visible target in its flightpath. The second, missile could have been guided by radar or, more probably, Electro-optically. This method would require the launch of two types of missiles, a C-801/802 for the “high” profile and a C-701 TV guided missile for the “low” profile.

According to an Associated Press report, based on an interview with an unnamed IDF official, the Israeli vessel didn’t use its electronic countermeasures systems as they did not anticipate such a threat in the area. Yet, this comment is questionable, as there were repeated intelligence reports about Iranian supplies of sophisticated equipment, missiles and drones to the Hizbollah. However, the naval or coastal defense missiles were not mentioned specifically, leading the Israelis to remain unaware of the imminent threat.

C-801 radar guided anti-ship missile weighs about 750 kg, it is powered by a rocket motor and has a range of 40 km and is equipped with 100 kg warhead. The upgraded C-802 uses a rocket booster for launch, and a turbojet cruise motor, giving it a range of up to 140. The warhead uses about 180 kg of shaped charge explosives, which makes it a most capable threat to major warships including U.S. aircraft carriers. The C-701, (also known as Iranian Kosar) is deployed with Iranian forces as a truck mounted coastal defense missile, it is much smaller than the C-801/802, weighing about 100 kg, its range is about 18-20 km and the warhead has 29 kg of explosives, set with a delayed activation fuze to maximize internal damage after hull penetration. It uses an Infrared/TV seeker or active millimeter terminal guidance.