Hezbollah
won the Second Lebanon War by achieving a propaganda victory over
Israel, a Harvard University study has concluded. Israel's defeat
came not at the hands of Hezbollah, however, but through the internal
contradictions of being the region's sole functioning democracy
in the Internet age. "An open society, Israel, is victimized
by its own openness," Marvin Kalb and Dr. Carol Saivetz of
the Shorenstein Center of Harvard University concluded in their
research paper, "The
Israeli Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical
Conflict".
The flagship of Hezbollah's media empire is its TV satellite channel,
Al-Manar, which was set up in 1991 with aid from the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards. The channel's broadcasts are slanted toward propaganda and
reflect Hezbollah's Iranian-inspired ideology and political agenda.
To win
its battle for hearts and minds, Hezbollah employs terminology
expressing Iran's extremist Shi'ite Islamic worldview. Special emphasis
is put on fostering the values of jihad (holy war) and shahadah
(death as a martyr for the sake of Allah) to justify the campaign
of terrorism and guerilla warfare waged by Hezbollah and the Palestinian
terrorist organizations against Israel.
Unfortunately,
western media, even including much of Israel's, have ignored Hezbollah's
weak point- its complete dependence on Tehran's radical Khomeinistic
Shiite doctrine, which contradicts Hezbollah's basic pragmatism-
fighting for Lebanon's nationalism.
Nevertheless, the organization waged a propaganda campaign using
sophisticated psychological warfare to attack its Israeli target
audience lowering public morale, cause panic, increase fear of its
rocket fire and enhancing Hezbollah's image as a strong opponent,
possessing impressive operational capabilities.
Al-Manar TV, which survived and remained on the air, even after
the Israeli air force bombed its building in a southern suburb of
Beirut has broadcast factual information throughout the war, mixed
shrewdly with propaganda about its rocket fire and the successes
it achieved in battle. Devoid of any reciprocal media balance by
Israel, Hezbollah's broadcasts served as a source for international
media. Hassan Nasrallah was interviewed six times during the war
and his statements were often quoted, especially in Lebanon, other
Middle Eastern countries and around the world. To a great extent,
during the war he succeeded in taking over TV screens, even in Israel
itself, thus achieving an enormous psychological advantage over
the local media and its rather clumsy official spokespersons.
Hezbollah's main propaganda achievements were the result of its
ability to prevent foreign journalists, Arab and Western alike ,
from directly accessing the combat zones and thus keep real-time
information away from them, making it impossible for them to cover
only topics which were compatible with the organization's propaganda
strategy. According to a postwar study by the Israeli Intelligence
and Terrorism Information Center the myth of Hezbollah's "divine
victory" concept of the campaign, was based on three
main elements:
- The IDF's failure to stop or significantly reduce Hezbollah
rocket fire throughout the war;
- The harsh internal criticism expressed for the IDF and the government
when the war ended: the many failures and mistakes exposed were
used and are still being used by Hezbollah as grist for its propaganda
mill.
- Israel's achievements and Hezbollah's failures in the war were
not sufficiently emphasized within Israel itself because of overblown
internal criticism. Therefore, they were not always picked up
in Lebanon and the Arab world, with the result that they did not
succeed in undermining Hezbollah's victory myth.
However,
as the dust settled in the months following the war, and as the
Lebanese internalized the destruction wrought upon their country,
the myth of the "divine victory" began to crack, as internal
criticism increased because of the high price Lebanon was forced
to pay for Hezbollah's military escapade. Even Iran has voiced its
displeasure over Nasrallah's war, as it destroyed, much too prematurely,
Tehran's painfully constructed forward base, before Iran could use
it as a viable deterrent against US-Israeli attacks on its ambitious
nuclear program.
Unfortunately, the public mood within Israel's society was already
too much involved in the postwar campaign of self-internecine search
for culcables, to exploit the opportunity, which already presented
itself on it's neighbor's doorstep.
The reason for Israel's strange behavior lies in a fundamental
development, which has evolved over decades and exacerbated since
Saddam Hussein's Scud offensive on Israel's rear, in Spring 1991.
In his highly provocative lecture, during last week's Annual Conference
for National Security held by the Herzliya-based Fisher Brother's
Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies, Dr. Guy
Bechor made some soul-searching observations over the new Arab
concept in fighting Israel's military might. Dr Bechor, a leading
Israeli expert in Arab affairs, expounded, that once the Arab regimes
and organizations around Israel had concluded, that a classic military
war waged by an Arab army against the IDF power base, would inevitably
bring about their defeat, such option was no longer feasible. Some
nations, like Egypt and Jordan, opted for peace with Israel by lack
of choice, while others, and particularly Islamic organizations,
started seeking a new method of warfighting. The result was a rather
sophisticated "resistance" model that was used in the
last Intifada and during the Second Lebanon War, shifting the fighting
from classic military confrontation to the Israeli home front, using
missiles, rockets and especially the notorious, but highly successful,
suicide bombers reaping havoc in Israeli cities.
Inevitably, the impact of missiles and rockets on Israel's public
consciousness has been overrated beyond its actual effectiveness,
enhanced mostly by irresponsible media reports. The sober fact indicates
that during Operation Desert Storm 1991, with 39 Scuds targeting
Israel, the total of the launched missiles that landed on Israel's
territory, while causing extensive property damage, resulted only
in two directly related deaths. In addition to two deaths by Scud
shrapnel, a total of seven Israelis died of suffocation from improper
use of their gas masks.
At the time, civilian reaction while serious, did not cause not
panic, due to the impression that US coalition was fighting its
war for them in Iraq and that the leadership had matters under control.
There was also a lull between attacks, which enabled conducting
normal life in between missile alerts.
The situation altered considerably last summer. During that war,
from July 13 to August 13, Israel Police reported 4,228 rocket impacts
inside Israel from rockets
fired by Hezbollah. No geographical area in the world has sustained
such a large quantity of rocket strikes since the Iran-Iraq war
in the early 1980s. Public reaction was devastating. Over a million
Israelis were huddling in shelters, for nearly six weeks, no central
control was visible and panic raged, as there were insufficient
pre-impact warnings given, enabling normal life conduct in between
alerts.
However, two important facts were withheld from the public: Most
rockets fired by Hezbollah at Israel were taken from the Syrian
arsenals rather than from Iran and only one-fourth of the rockets
that landed within Israel actually landed within built-up areas.
Compared to the massive barrage, sustained over nearly six weeks,
the results were rather unimpressive. Israel's losses and damage
from Hezbollah rocket attacks included civilian 53 fatalities, 250
severely wounded, and 2,000 lightly wounded, mostly Post Traumatic
Stress victims. There was extensive damage to hundreds of dwellings,
several public utilities, and dozens of industrial plants. But the
most damaging aspect was that over one million Israelis were forced
to live near or in shelters or security rooms, with some 250,000
civilians evacuating the high-risk north, relocating to other areas
in the country, considered safe. The latter became one of the reasons
for the public outrage over Ehud Olmert's deplorable conduct of
the war.
Still, much could have been saved, if Israel's leadership had
excreted its control over the media. Hezbollah was able to skillfully
exploit the technological innovations wrought by the internet and
the demands of the international news cycle, by constructing the
narrative story line for the "first really 'live' war in history",
where "the camera and the computer" became unrestricted
"weapons of war." As a tight, centrally controlled sect,
Hezbollah retained almost total grip of the daily message of journalism
and propaganda, thus shrewdly manipulating its image to the world.
No reporter was allowed into the zone of battle by Hezbollah media
agents, which kept strictly manipulated control over any visits
to places where maximum damage was inflicted on what seemed civilian
properties.
On the Israeli side, the situation was chaotic. While officials
made mostly awkward and ineffective efforts to control and contain
media coverage, these essentially failed and the press quickly gained
unfettered access to the battlefield. Network anchors, representing
cable TV operations, ranging from Al Jazeera to Fox news, managed
to set up their cameras along the Israeli-Lebanese border, right
along IDF forces going in and out of Lebanon. The result was devastating
to public morale, which was bombarded by uncensored information,
usually incorrect, or even manipulative, by rating-competitive news
networks. "In strictly military terms, Israel did not lose
to Hezbollah in this war, but it clearly did not win. In the war
of information, news and propaganda, the battlefield central to
Hezbollah's strategy, Israel lost this war," Kalb and Saivetz
concluded in their study.
A closed society can control the image and the message that it
wishes to convey to the rest of the world is, by far more effectively
than that of an open democratic society, especially one engaged
in an existential struggle for its survival. Under critical situations,
like asymmetric warfare, a democratic society quickly becomes the
victim of its own openness. During the war, no Hezbollah secrets
were disclosed, but in Israel secrets were constantly leaked, rumors
spreading like wildfire, so that leaders frequently felt obliged
to issue ill-prepared and hasty statements, often based on incomplete
knowledge. Journalists and pseudo-experts were driven by competing
news networks to publish and broadcast unsubstantiated information,
contradicting factual information-with devastating moral effect
on the public. An open society, buffeted by the crosswinds of reality,
rumor, self criticism and irresponsible revelation, normally will
convey the impression of total disorder, chaos and uncertainty.
Under these circumstances, Israel became unfortunately "victimized
by its own openness."
This deplorable situation inevitably brought about serious repercussions,
which could become critical in a future crisis situation. Much of
this perception is brought about by the unfettered revelations of
the Winograd Commission reports. Results can already be clearly
visible in the reaction of the Arab world.
"The Winograd report stressed that Hezbollah was victorious
and that Israel is beatable," a senior spokesman for the Iranian-backed
group told the organization's Al-Manar television channel. In fact,
the shockwaves going through Israel, like the commissions of inquiry,
political turmoil and social instability are already enhancing Nasrallah's
perception, which aims to see Israeli democracy destroying itself.
Nasrallah and his Iranian mentors clearly believe that the most
important aspect is to shift the war deep into Israeli territory
"and to pierce its castle walls." The shockwaves in Israel,
the outcry and the loss of a sense of security already mark a psychological
triumph for Islamic Jihad".
While all this is going on, senior analysts warn, the Israeli
society is unfortunately busy as usual, with internal battles, cruelly
tearing off its own limbs in regarding the past and with self -hate,
whose origins are hard to fathom, all this, while the imminent threats
are already clearly visible.
The Iranian deputy interior minister has explicitly warned, that
in the event of an American attack, Iran would fire tens of thousands
of missiles at Israel; Syria is moving and positioning thousands
of missiles close to the border with Israel; Hezbollah has completed
the replenishment of its missiles and rockets arsenal, which is
capable of striking at the heart of Israel and Hamas has transferred
tons of explosives and rockets into the Gaza Strip in an attempt
to create a balance of power with the IDF.
The dominant question is therefore asked by military experts,
whether the IDF is capable of fighting a multi-frontal war within
a foreseeable time. Under its new chief, Lieutenant General Gabi
Ashkenazi, the IDF is investing huge efforts to recover its basic
operational faculties. Filling the gaps in emergency depots and
holding large-scale, realistic military exercises, with combined
forces is now the high-priority order-of-the-day. But there are
some crucial issues which have to be resolved without delay. Can
Israel's political leadership sustain another crisis management,
without taking some drastic steps to redress the recent failures?
Does Israel have its own missile arsenal for creating an adequate
and viable deterrence against Iran, Syria or other "rogue"
nations, which might still provoke a military foray, taking advantage
of Israel's ostensive weakness? There are no simple answers to these
questions, but some of these will, no doubt, be found in Washington.
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