There is no argument whatsoever, that any government's job is
to prepare for all contingencies and in Israel, being under constant
threat from a still hostile Muslim world, this issue must be fully
addressed by its defense community. Iran has officially declared
its intention to destroy the Jewish state and, if Israel wishes
to survive, it must prepare itself for even the worst case scenario
of a nuclear Iran- which, once having the capability will also
try to use it.
The question is not whether Israel has the will to stop Iran's
nuclear ambitions - no doubt it would like to, but has it really
the means to implement this intention? On the other hand, the
US certainly has the means, but will Washington give the order
and prevent Iran from becoming an unpredictable nuclear power?
At this time, barring a lot of tough talk, no such action seems
imminent and nearing the end of George W Bush's second term in
the White House, determined action seems highly questionable.
So Iran will probably become the first "rogue" nation
to have a nuclear bomb in its arsenal. By all means this itself
represents an abhorrent prediction - but unfortunately has to
be taken at its realistic face value. 
Last Thursday, the UN nuclear watchdog Mohammed El-Baradei' presented
his report on Iran. Singing its praise, the Vienna placed UN office
found Iran to be "generally truthful" about key aspects
of its nuclear history, but warned that its knowledge of Tehran's
present atomic work was shrinking. Unfortunately, like such former
reports, this one contained more questions than answers: "The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remained unable to ascertain
that Iran did not have a secret, parallel military enrichment
program because Tehran was still denying inspector visits to anything
but its few declared nuclear facilities" it concluded.
There is no doubt that one man in Tehran was very happy with
El-Baradei's report! "We welcome this, that the International
Atomic Energy Agency has found its role and with the publication
of Mohammed El-Baradei's report the world will see that the Iranian
nation has been right and the resistance of our nation has been
correct," President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said glibly.
-
In fact, based on it's past achievements, the
International Atomic Energy Agency's operational record is rather,
to say the least, highly problematic:
Before the 1991 Gulf War (before Dr El-Baradei’s appointment),
the IAEA failed to detect Saddam Hussein's nuclear program.
After the war, it was startled by the scale of his work to make
fissile material.
-
Under Dr El-Baradei, the IAEA totally missed
the Libyan nuclear program, which Libya only chose to reveal
after the 2003 Iraq war.
-
It missed, or ignored Iran’s long-time
covert nuclear research program, which was already exposed by
Iranian dissidents three years ago.
-
Its biggest shamble was probably failing to
uncover the "nuclear supermarket" run by the ""father
of the Islamic bomb" Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, the notorious
Pakistani scientist who sold plans and components to Libya,
North Korea and finally Iran.
Whether
Israel, or in fact, any other well armed and prepared nation facing
a nuclear threat should however tremble with fear from such a
horrible doomsday weapon remains debatable, if the facts be carefully
examined and assessed.
There is little argument, that a nuclear warhead can destroy
an entire city, or even much more. A small, but increasing, number
of nations already possess nuclear missiles. However, no nation
has ever launched a nuclear missile against an enemy. Moreover,
nuclear war isn't something one decides en-passant some morning
and initiating it on the following afternoon. Such highly complex
and dangerous action requires intensive pre-planning and preparation
over a period of months and even years. Therefore, special tasks
must be carried out to assure post-war recovery, which will not
remain one-sided, to assure, what Russian strategists named "nuclear
rocket supremacy." For example, an attacker must quietly
move key factories to secret underground locations. An attacker
must also stockpile strategic supplies, raw materials, food, fuel,
and machine tools for rebuilding vital industries. In fact, the
most dramatic advanced measures would no doubt be leaked in vigilant
press reports. During the Cold War Russian generals believed that
only an extensive disinformation campaign could mask such preparations.
Sofar Israel has staunchly maintained its so-called nuclear
ambiguity policy, which has served the nation's strategic options
extremely well. However, should Iran, or for that matter other
Arab countries, opt for a nuclear weapon, it seems only logical
that the Jewish state would have to adapt a different nuclear
strategy in order to maintain its viable deterrent fully convincing.
There are some signs that this process is already under new scrutiny.
Despite all recent denials by the PM advisory entourage, following
last Thursday's Reuter report, one of the topics of Olmert's ordered
"secret memorandum was being prepared for "the day after"
Iran owned atomic warheads", could perhaps re-assess Israel's
ambiguity policy, coming to terms with the new evolving regional
circumstances.
Defensive and Offensive Options
All realistic assessments indicate clearly, that Israel cannot
afford to create, neither passive nor a hermetical active
defense layer to totally prevent a nuclear warhead-tipped
ballistic missile to strike its major cities. In order to create
a viable and convincing deterrent ensuring its very survival,
Israel has to establish the following strategies:
-
Create a mixed defensive-offensive strike capability
- based on long term technological assessments of enemy capabilities
-
Establish a political system, under which critical
strategic decisions can be reached and implemented within minutes,
once a nuclear strike warning becomes imminent, based on totally
reliable real-time intelligence.
-
Maintain "no-fail" rapid reaction
infrastructure system of constant high-alert defensive and offensive
means - on minute stand-by to implement political decisions
once issued, verified and authenticated.
-
Persistent long-range and round-the clock real-time
intelligence assets constantly monitoring high-resolution space
imagery, covering potential and suspected high-profile launch
sites in enemy territory, transmitted through high-security
data networks to operational command centers, manned by experienced
professionals on 24 hour alert status.
-
Deploy reliable early-warning network giving
adequate alert, getting maximum people in potential high-risk
targets into some sort of shelter before missile impact, or,
as an emergency contingency- implement mass evacuation, if time
permits safe implementation.
While passive or active defenses can prevent an accidental or
limited attack, and reduce a massive attack, defensive measures
have limitations when facing a determined nuclear strike:
-
Passive "fortification doctrine",
supposed to absorb an attack by minimizing the damage of a missile
attack on the home front is regarded by experts as illusory,
if not totally insupportable through economic constraints. Atomic
shelters are considered ineffective, as they can neither fully
protect the population against modern nuclear weapons, nor enable
those seeking shelter under the attack itself, to emerge unscathed
while the radioactive fallout "cloud" is still hovering
over the attacked environment.
-
Active defenses by missile interceptors cannot
provide 'hermetic' defense against massive, determined saturation
attacks. Yet, under Israel's stringent geo-political constraints
- even a single nuclear explosion can reap catastrophic, if
not actual existential human and economic consequences.
Pre-emptive First or Second Strike Option
Retired Major General Yitzhak Ben-Yisrael, former head of the
Israel Ministry of Defense 'Defense Research and Development Directorate'
specified that although Israel’s nuclear deterrent policy
remained important in the country’s defense doctrine, developing
a pre-emptive strike capability is also necessary. "As a
small country," Ben-Yisrael said, "we cannot go into
battle for lengthy periods of time and the option of a preemptive
strike is in line with this."
According to the prestigious London newsletter Foreign Report,
published in 2007, the Israeli Defense Ministry is reportedly
pressuring government officials to authorize a policy that would
allow Israel to retaliate with nuclear weapons, in the event that
it suffers a nuclear first-strike attack. The newsletter also
reported that the Israeli government is "coming to terms"
with the possibility that Israel’s nuclear deterrent will
be inadequate, because an Iranian nuclear first strike could disable
or destroy Israel’s capability to retaliate.
Much has been written lately in the open Israeli media over
Israel's potential "second strike" option by a submerged
submarine fleet, led by the German delivered Dolphin subs. A second
strike option may be a viable option, as long as the active defense
barrier is considered fully reliable, establishing a 'full proof'
barrier against a nuclear attack, or keeping their damage within
"acceptable" proportion. However, given the geographic
and demographic situation of the country, Israel cannot tolerate
any nuclear incident anywhere in or near its territory. In other
words, Israel cannot absorb or tolerate any 'lesser' nuclear strike,
weather it is aimed at its heavily populated center or attack
strategic or military targets.
Israel's vulnerability is inherent of its small size and densely
populated area. Almost half of the nation's population (2-3 million)
reside or work in and around the Tel Aviv metropolis area, which
is also the nation's business and finance center. 50 km to the
east Jerusalem, the nation's capital and religious center for
Jews, Moslems and Christians also has a population of around one
million while Haifa, the third largest city located less than
100 km to the north. A nuclear strike on or near any of the cities
has the potential to kill hundreds of thousands people in the
first instant, tens of thousands more would perish from fires
and radiation.
Absence of a 'retaliatory option' leaves no other option but
'pre-emptive strike', where a nation would launch a preliminary
strike against an enemy, once there are clear indications of an
imminent attack. A hypothetical, measured pre-emptive strike could
use unconventional effects employed as 'last resort warning' before
attacking sensitive targets. Modern intelligence gathering resources
are already available to provide such 'clear and indisputable
indications' in time for the leaders to take decisive action.
When and if such determined action is executed, it should have
dramatic, 'game changing' effects that could prevent a nuclear
collision between democtratic-led moderates and a fanatic rogue
statehood.
Before Israel could take such course, it should be prepared
to lift the veil off its true capabilities by aborting its decade-long
nuclear ambiguity
policy. This policy has served Israel well under a nuclear-free
Middle East, but will no longer maintain its true value, when,
for example Iran declares its new nuclear weapons capability.
It will then become imperative for Israel, to bring its full-scale
operational capabilities fully to light, in order to convince
any "newcomer" to the nuclear club, that further hostile
declarations, moreover actual threat will be dealt with, by decisive
and devastating response, making any threats a high-risk adventure,
with insurmountable consequences for any potential attacker.
"Samson Option" is it still valid?
All Israeli leaders, from every political party have repeatedly
sworn that "Never again would the Jewish people be subjected
to another Holocaust threat". Within this solemn pledge,
first strikes have characterized the Israeli's foreign policy.
The highly effective Israeli first-strike air assault on June
5, 1967, destroyed the entire Egyptian air force on the ground
at the start of the Six-Day War. But more parallel to the urgency
surrounding the situation of Iran's having nuclear weapons is
the June 1981 air attack that took out Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor.
A pre-emptive strike option was mentioned repeatedly when analyzing
Israel's options for a retaliatory strike on hostile nuclear potential,
before it is too late. The use of nuclear attack was referred
to as a "Samson
Option", described by several fiction and non-fiction
authors, as it remind of the famous biblical story of Samson's
war with the Philistines (Judges 16:4-30).
Israel's geography needs no reminder what kind of existential
threat a nuclear attack could pose on its population centers.
A nuclear threat from the Tehran "mullahs with nukes"
cannot be tolerated. Any such threat, once imminent, must be forestalled
by all means.
For further reading we recommend:
Defense Updat Analysis, November 10, 2007:
Defense Update Analysis December 2006:
Defense Update Analysis Sept. 14, 2007:
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