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Even with the most advanced technology in C4ISR
available in OIF, the surprisingly ultra-rapid advance of US led
coalition ground forces, often left division, corps headquarters out
of the communications loop. In part, the higher command level had
anticipated this trend, based on experience in 1991 Desert Storm. As
a lesson, tactical commanders were trained to think and act
independently making decisions during the ever changing combat
situation. The German Auftragstaktik (Mission control),
leaving the tactical commander sufficient leeway to act on his own
initiative within the general mission framework, has long proved its
effectiveness in fast moving mobile combat operations. The Israeli
army has near perfected this doctrine in two of the Arab-Israeli
lightning wars, in 1956 and 1967.
The concept of Net Centric Warfare has tremendous potential in
placing the right tools for seamless mission control in the hands of
future military commanders. NCW can link disparate portions of the
shifting battlefield in constant "live feed" commentary both up and
down the command 'Grapevine'. In principle, NCW integrates a wide
array of sophisticated elements, developed on the latest hi-tech
state-of-the-art technologies.
While the Global Command and Control System-Army ( GCCS-A) is
designed for communications interoperability at the higher command
echelons, the new, mobile, Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and
Below (FBCB2) and Blue Force Tracking (BFT) network provides
interoperability at tactical command level. The FBCB2 system
integrates location data from a position locating guidance radio (PLGR)
into a computer housed digital terrain map display monitor. To
facilitate message handling, the system uses a messaging format and
delivery database as well as graphic display of important tactical
information. A brand new system, so-far operated solely by 4th US
Mechanized Infantry Div uses a data radio Enhanced Position
Locations Reporting (EPLRS) system. Based on synchronized radio
transmissions, EPLRS provides near real- time secure data
communications, identification, navigation, automatically monitoring
of friendly forces movements and locations.
In theory, the NCW system should have enabled hitherto unavailable
combat control and rapid information sharing process at all levels
of command through its: " ability to move 'real-time' intelligence
rapidly from 'sensor' to either analytical decision levels or
directly to the 'shooter', in the words of Brigadier Dennis C. Moran
director J-6 US Army CENTCOM. Indeed, CENTCOM headquarters did have
a common operating picture of both 'blue' and 'red' forces most of
the time during OIF, but the system was not free of flaws after all.
First of all, the age old principle in the notorious 'Murphy's Law'
still applied in OIF: "it is not if the technology will fail but
when it will fail" that caused commanders headaches. According to
after action reports, problems were still encountered integrating
the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). In spite of the sophisticated
technology, not all radios could 'talk to each other'. The US Marine
Corps has its own set of digital command and control devices, all
different from the US Army.
Two examples could indicate this clearly:
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The mistaken artillery barrage, which hit the US
marines at Nasiriya bridge: "On March 27 another ground B+B
incident caused 37 casualties among the US marines of 2nd
Battalion 8th Marines. Although the Marines had some of the most
sophisticated equipment to prevent such a tragic accident,
including thermal imaging, night vision gear and computers, to
keep track of each other's movements, even this hi-tech equipment
failed to prevent such a tragic event. The 2nd Battalion command
post called for artillery support near An Nasiriyah bridge, but
the shots fell short, exploding among the Marines with devastating
results. Just then a communication break happened, while radio
operators were frantically trying to call off the fire in vain. In
the midth of the chaos, shells kept exploding for 90(!) minutes,
until finally contact was re-established, but the damage was
already done."
Unfortunately, this goes even further. For example,
many of the current generation tactical radios are still not fully
compatible, or adaptive enough to support the advanced reporting
systems. Cross-band digital communication communications is
difficult and requires different radio equipment for frequency bands
used. This becomes extremely problematic in fast moving operations,
where mobile tactical command groups normally, restricted in space,
are already overloaded to capacity with critical equipment. |
