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 In most modern armies, the standard post
WWII five tank platoon organization has been changed to either four or
three vehicles per platoon/troop. The original concept behind the five
tank platoon was to have two separate fire and movement sections, with
the platoon leader joining one at will, as required by the combat
situation. Postwar developments envisaged not only a
shortage of tank crews, but also a significant reduction in funding,
both requiring restructuring of tactical sub-units. Moreover, the
technological advances made in modern battle tank design have allowed
a reduction in the number of vehicles, while maintaining the same, or
even superior battlefield performance.
The Israeli army, which has had substantial
experience with tank warfare in the post WWII period, has shifted from
five to four and finally three tanks per basic platoon, in order to
increase the number of gun tubes deployed per tank company. The
original IDF tank unit structure, which was developed for open desert
tank warfare, was an 11 tank company (3 tanks x 3 platoons + 2 HQ
tanks) allowing IDF tank units to have 8 gun tubes firing and three
tanks moving at all times. This structure proved particularly suitable
for high attrition tank versus tank engagements. Under the current IDF
reorganization program, there have been some thoughts of reducing the
Merkava Mk4 companies to seven vehicles. (1 HQ vehicle) This
structure, made possible by these tank’s advanced technology and
enhanced capabilities, is being considered because it would allow two
tank sections to operate autonomously.
The US Army has adopted the four tank platoon, rejecting the
three-tank solution in order to maintain the two sections of two tanks
support mode.
The German Bundeswehr has shifted from four
tanks in its platoons and 13 Leopard 2A4 tanks (4 tanks x 3 platoons +
1 command tank) per company used under Army Structure 3, to its new 13
Leopard 2A6 company with only three tanks in each platoon (3 tanks x 4
platoons + 1 command tank) in its latest organization (Army Structure
5N).
The basic Russian T-72/80/90 tank platoon is
still their traditional three vehicle formation, however, there are
reports of a new concept being examined, under which a five AFV
platoon will be established, with four tanks and a
BMPT as the fifth
vehicle. The BMPT is an entirely new class of vehicle known as a Tank
Assistance Combat Vehicle. The Russians claim that this vehicle, by
supporting the MBTs, increases their combat efficiency by 30%. The
BMPT deals with all secondary targets, allowing the MBTs to focus on
engaging the ‘heavy’ targets, which their main armament is designed
for. The BMPT, based on T-72/-90 hulls, mounts an array of advanced
anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons. These weapons systems include
eight launchers mounting a combination of AT-9 Ataka guided anti-tank
missiles or Igla short range air defense missiles, 30mm automatic
cannon, multiple 30mm automatic grenade launchers and 7.62 machine
guns.
Combat experience in urban fighting has
clearly demonstrated the advantages of the four tank platoon. Fighting
through narrow alleys, where tanks operate in two tank sections
supporting infantry, a three tank platoon would not only be
inadequate, but also uneconomical, as the remaining single vehicle
would in most cases be left behind, or not effectively used by the
infantry commander, making it highly vulnerable to enemy tank killer
teams. The alternative would be to use all three tanks of the platoon
together, which would probably provide more firepower and more control
problems than necessary. In addition, although the infantry commander
may have the best intentions, his true function, and the one he has
spent the most time training for, is controlling his own troops, not a
tank or group of tanks temporarily assigned to his unit.
From a purely economical viewpoint, reverting to the four tank platoon
and 13 tanks per company would eliminate the second HQ tank, leaving a
single tank for the company commander. The second HQ vehicle could be
replaced by an APC or AIFV, capable of fighting and moving with the
company, but with superior C4I facilities on board.
The British army tank squadron has a 14 tank
structure with four troops (platoons) of 3 Challenger II tanks and two
tanks in the HQ section. These four troop squadrons give the squadron
leaders the choice of forming two-tank sections, although in some
cases with the two tanks coming from different platoons, without
creating too much degradation in the squadron command structure, or
leaving single tanks vulnerable, as might happen with a three-tank by
three platoon company.
The US Army has several basic scenarios for
task organizing a small unit combined task force for urban combat.
The Tank Platoon as
a Maneuver Element
In this scenario, the tank platoon leader is
responsible for coordinating the maneuvering of his tanks. Using this
task organization, likely missions for the tanks would be to provide
fire support or overwatch for the movement of infantry units. This is
also the most difficult of these methods to control because of the
effort required to coordinate the movements of the two types of units.
The tank platoon leader may choose to maneuver his platoon in
sections. (Two tanks each from a four tank platoon) This provides
greater flexibility in supporting the infantry during combat, but
places greater responsibility on the NCO commander of the ‘light’ tank
section when operating independently with the infantry commander. (The
advantage of an experienced NCO in this situation is clear. The
availability of tank commanders with the required level of experience
in mandatory short-service armies can present a problem.)
Tank Sections Under
Infantry Platoon Control
In this scenario, tanks platoons are broken
down into two sections, each section being placed under the
operational control of an Infantry platoon leader. While this
technique is very effective in maintaining the same rate of progress
for the tanks and infantry, it requires pre-mission training in tank
combat control for the infantry platoon leaders. Normally, tank
crewmen resent this kind of control, as the infantry commander will,
in some cases, prefer to assign single tanks (not co located with the
infantry) to provide close support. This endangers the tanks because
they are vulnerable to tank killer teams in any kind of terrain that
is not open.
Infantry Squads Under
Tank Platoon Control
In this scenario, the company team commander
places one or more infantry squads under the operational control of a
tank platoon leader. This technique is very effective in relatively
open urban terrain where a tank platoon can operate as a unit, with
the infantry providing close-in protection against enemy tank-killer
teams. This is the tank commander’s preferred option as it allows the
tanks to operate under the most ideal conditions available to them in
urban combat, where they are especially vulnerable to close range
attacks. This technique requires that junior tank unit commanders be
pre-trained in tank-infantry cooperation down to the section-squad
level. The platoon commander co-ordinates the unit’s firepower using
various methods, the best of which is via the infantry coordination
phone mounted on the rear of the tanks. These external phones connect
the infantry leader into the tank’s communication system allowing them
to communicate directly with the tank crew, or the tank platoon
commander even if he is in different tank.
The following
topics are covered in this article:
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