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 An exception to this strategy was Operation Homat
Magen (Defensive Shield) in April 2002, which followed a series of
deadly Palestinian suicide attacks launched from the West Bank. The
IDF entered the West Bank urban centers simultaneously in order to
defeat the terrorist networks in their 'backyards'.
Two actions demonstrate the different approaches - The operation in
Nablus, considered to be the toughest stronghold, went surprisingly
smoothly, as elite paratroop units broke into the dense dwellings of
the Qasba, (the ancient inner city), suffering minimum casualties.
Specially trained for such operations, the paratroops used new
breeching equipment to open gateways into the dense Qasba and between
walls of neighboring houses This enabled them to move inside the
buildings, well protected by the massive walls, and allowed bypassing
of the IED ambushes prepared by the Palestinians. Two of the most
challenging aspects of this operation were maintaining situational
awareness and avoidance of "blue on Blue"
fratricide incidents.
Operations in the Palestinian refugee camp of Jenin demonstrated a
different approach. Publicized for the high casualties suffered by
both sides and the massive devastation to civilian property, this
operation was executed under pressure, following conventional urban
combat methods. To minimize casualties among non-combatants, the IDF
tried to evacuate civilians from the area before the attack. These
measures delayed operations and enabled terrorists to prepare their
defenses. In retrospect, this approach has proven to be unsuitable for
Urban-LIC. Jenin also demonstrated the high lethality potential of
urban combat. The IDF suffered most of its casualties as dismounted
troops entered ‘kill zones’ and were engaged by multiple IEDs and
small arms fire. Large armored vehicles could not enter the narrow
streets of the refugee camp, which necessitated the employment of
heavy armored engineering equipment to destroy infrastructure in order
to open fields of fire and allow necessary mobility, an action that
created criticism in Israel and abroad.
Tactics adopted following these campaigns improved urban fighting
capability of the IDF and prepared troops for situations where
innocent civilians are present. The new tactics allow IDF forces to
minimize collateral damage while denying the terrorists the use of
civilians as human shields.
Stealth Operations
The topography of the West Bank enables Israeli forces to
completely cover the target area with surveillance, effectively
blocking escape routes. Continuous activity dramatically reduces the
number of insurgent activities in the area.
Among the Special Operations units created for urban warfare in the
West Bank is Duvdevan (Cherry), an undercover infantry unit,
trained to blend into the Arab population. The role of Duvdevan teams
is to apprehend suspects when possible or, if apprehension is not
possible, to neutralize these hostile targets. When performed
successfully, these stealth operations end without any territorial
gains, but result in the capture of live terrorists, key members of
the "IDF most wanted list", who provide valuable intelligence for
follow-on operations.
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