The
Middle East, for decades the traditional cradle for spreading
"sabre rattling" rumors, has once again become the
focal point of war drums as both sides, Tehran and Washington
are flexing the muscles with threatening moves.
Russian intelligence has spread "reliable" information
from its so-called regional intelligence sources, that 'the
U.S. Armed Forces have nearly completed preparations for a possible
military operation against Iran, and will be ready to strike
in early April', a security official claimed last Friday. The
'source' warned that the US Navy had already compiled a list
of possible targets on Iranian territory and practiced the operation
during last week's exercises in the Persian Gulf. If the Russian
predictions are correct, at least one has not too long to wait
in high tension until the bludgeon falls! With the powerful
build-up of a huge US and French naval armada deployed in the
turbulent Persian Gulf, anything can happen at any moment.
The
spark, which could light the fuse, was provided already on March
23 in the strategic Shat-el-Arab, one of history's most sensitive
focal points. Although the present tension did not start with
the capture of the 15 British sailors in the Shat-el-Arab waterways,
it seems a strange coincidence from a military professional
viewpoint, that the Brits actually went into the trap. Was the
capture of the Royal Navy boarding party a well orchestrated
setup where the Iranians had been hoping a ship would be boarded
and sprung the trap when the Brits came abroad? Or did the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have inside information that
the freighter could have been carrying supplies for Shia insurgents
and the vessel was being boarded when the Iranians may have
decided the contents were worth protecting and launched their
ambush on the sailors?
the
normal operational procedure for a Royal Navy boarding
party, should be to place themselves in position to
render covering and supporting fire, should the operation
escalate, before or after the boarding party is located
on the inspected vessel.
The serious incident, which has not been solved sofar, but
already threatens to escalate further as each side is hardening
its position, could bring this already highly explosive region
onto the verge of a real war. But Friday March 23 hi-jacking
was not the first involving British seamen: In 2004 eight British
sailors were captured by Iranian commandos near the very same
area, but they were quickly released at that time. Could it
be that Iranian president Ahmadinejad wishes to retaliate the
equally embarrassing and still mysterious disappearance of his
top general Ali Reza Asgari, who vanished into thin air two
months ago?
From the British side, the Royal Navy also took the unusual
step of making public charts, photographs and previously secret
navigational coordinates purportedly proving that the British
sailors were 1.7 nautical miles inside Iraqi waters when they
were apprehended at gun-point and forced into Iranian waters.
Information contained in the Cornwall's Xeres computer tracking
system pinpoints the two boarding boats' precise location when
the sailors were detained. This allows the mother ship to store
and update the position of each boarding party from up to 10
miles away. It seems highly likely the Iranians are aware the
boats were in Iraqi territorial waters. "Tracking devices
showed that their exact location was nowhere near Iranian territorial
waters", Royal Navy sources said.
But there are some highly intriguing military issues pondering
over the 23rd March incident.
Based
on the publicly available data, which may well be incomplete,
at this stage, the Royal Navy boarding party (BP) were doing
a standard 'boarding and check' operation on a freighter inside
Iraqi waters when the IRGC appeared, out of nowhere, in half
a dozen attack speedboats, taking the Brits completely by surprise.
Without a shot fired by either side, the British sailors went
into captivity. From a sheer military standpoint, it seems totally
irrelevant, whether the party was on the Iraqi or Iranian "thalweg"
which divides the waterway. What should be examined is how a
fully armed boarding party manned by experienced Royal Marine
Commandos let themselves be taken without a fight, while their
mothership and a hovering helicopter were within sight, or at
least should have been? As already mentioned, we are not party
to classified data, which could perhaps shed some light on this
incident, but from what we gather from information, sofar made
available, here are some distinct questions which should be
raised:
- According to our knowledge, the normal operational procedure
for a Royal Navy boarding party, (and for that matter any other
such operational party) should be to place themselves in position
to render covering and supporting fire, should the operation
escalate, before or after the boarding party is located on the
inspected vessel. Mission of the covering party is to observe
the surrounding area, against intruding hostile elements, clearly
aware that the thalweg is not far away (the entire width of
the Shat-el-Arab at this point varies only up to half a mile)
and to its east, all territory must at least be regarded as
hostile to British naval presence. Even if according to UK MOD
published charts the incident took place outside of the Shat-el-Arab
mouth, warning should have come even earlier, as the speedboats
approached the open sea. Was it complacency, due to previous
attempts by IRGC, which did not materialize into action, which
are the cause? It is well known, that Iran does not acknowledge
coalition presence in Iraq, certainly not its operations in
the disputed Shat-el-Arab waterway.
- The authorities claim, that the IRGC speedboats were armed
with machine guns. In this respect, one has to point to the
fact, that the British Zodiac Rigid Inflatable Boats (RIBs)
used by the RN boarding party are capable of over 30 knots and
are armed with shipboard mounted GPMGs (General Purpose Machine
Guns), by all means a formidable weapon and not to mention the
party's personal weapons, which should have been brought into
action by the covering party, against the approaching IRGC,
or at least warning these, before coming into range.
- As to supporting elements: one may enquire as to what distance
the boarding party was from its supporting elements, when boarding
the suspect vessel. According to standard procedure, due to
effective weapon ranges, the BP distance should not exceed 1,800
meters from the supporting elements, which in this particular
case were the party's mother ship HMS Cornwall, a type 22 Frigate
bristling with formidable firepower and sophisticated electronics
and its Lynx helicopter, which should have been observing from
above.
- If the operation went according to standard operations procedure,
then either the ship's radar or the helicopter crew must have
detected a hostile party of no less than six speedboats going
at full power and heading straight towards the thalweg divide.
This would have alerted the boarding party, to call off their
mission, either take evasive action by speeding towards the
mothership, or at least opening warning fire from on-board weapons
to head off the attackers as they passed the thalweg divide.
For the sake of operational argument, it must seem totally irrelevant
if the boarding party was on the east or west side of the thalweg
divide at the time of the incident. Another option could have
been for the boarding party commander, when alerted and assessing
the situation, to try and evade capture by using his boat's
speed to escape into the supporting range of the Cornwall. A
claim that part of the BP was already aboard the inspected vessel,
should only emphasize the importance of the supporting elements
under such conditions, to either warn the BP commander to abort
mission immediately or take up firing positions before the hostile
boats come within range. In an extreme case, the Cornwall could
have fired warning shots to head off the attackers if they persisted
in closing in on the boarding party. Unfortunately, as it seems,
neither options were in force and 15 Brits went into the bag
without a shot being fired on either side.
Sofar no explanation has been offered over this deeply embarrassing
incident by an authoritative source in Britain. Neither the
coalition task force commander Commodore Nick Lambert, nor Commander
Jeremy Woods of the Cornwall were allowed to elaborate, although
a BBC
reporter Ian Pannell, was actually on the ship's deck during
the incident.
No wonder then that rumors are circulating among analysts and
pseudo-experts claiming that all went wrong on that fateful
day. Some even point out that lately naval operations seem to
hit a new low, reminding of the embarrassing incident on Friday
July 14 when Hezbollah
fired a Chinese C-802 missile which hit the Israeli Navy Saar-5
missile boat off Beirut. Then, as reported, the ship's electronics
and defense systems were switched off and only by sheer miracle
this excellent ship was saved from sinking.
A similar event nearly forty years ago can clearly demonstrate
what criminal complacency can cause. Just before sunset on October
21st 1967 the Israeli Navy destroyer Eilat ( formerly HMS Zealous)
was sunk by an Egyptian Russian made Styx anti-ship missile
while patrolling 14 miles off Port Said. Following some successful
naval operations against the Egyptian Navy in this area during
the Six Day war in June 1967, there was heightened complacency
among Israeli naval officers, who ordered the ponderous destroyer
to continue patrolling within sight of the Egyptian defenses.
The deadly ambush was not long in waiting. Suddenly, some strange
fiery rockets were fired straight at the ship from Port Said
Harbor, which were not understood, as such weapons had never
been encountered. Within seconds four Styx missiles sank the
Eilat. It became a seismic event in modern naval warfare, as
for the first time, a naval battle was decided, not by guns
or torpedoes, but a new weapon, totally unknown to sailors.
Was the combat situation on HMS Cornwall on March 23 similar?
One should only hope that the navies of both nations have learnt
the lessons of their serious misconducts and should war erupt
in the Gulf, operations will go forth on a smoother, more professional
standard.
The
Middle East, for decades the traditional cradle for spreading
"sabre rattling" rumors, has once again become the
focal point of war drums as both sides, Tehran and Washington
are flexing the muscles with threatening moves. 
The
spark, which could light the fuse, was provided already on March
23 in the strategic Shat-el-Arab, one of history's most sensitive
focal points. Although the present tension did not start with
the capture of the 15 British sailors in the Shat-el-Arab waterways,
it seems a strange coincidence from a military professional
viewpoint, that the Brits actually went into the trap. Was the
capture of the Royal Navy boarding party a well orchestrated
setup where the Iranians had been hoping a ship would be boarded
and sprung the trap when the Brits came abroad? Or did the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have inside information that
the freighter could have been carrying supplies for Shia insurgents
and the vessel was being boarded when the Iranians may have
decided the contents were worth protecting and launched their
ambush on the sailors?
the
normal operational procedure for a Royal Navy boarding
party, should be to place themselves in position to
render covering and supporting fire, should the operation
escalate, before or after the boarding party is located
on the inspected vessel.
Based
on the publicly available data, which may well be incomplete,
at this stage, the Royal Navy boarding party (BP) were doing
a standard 'boarding and check' operation on a freighter inside
Iraqi waters when the IRGC appeared, out of nowhere, in half
a dozen attack speedboats, taking the Brits completely by surprise.
Without a shot fired by either side, the British sailors went
into captivity. From a sheer military standpoint, it seems totally
irrelevant, whether the party was on the Iraqi or Iranian "thalweg"
which divides the waterway. What should be examined is how a
fully armed boarding party manned by experienced Royal Marine
Commandos let themselves be taken without a fight, while their
mothership and a hovering helicopter were within sight, or at
least should have been? As already mentioned, we are not party
to classified data, which could perhaps shed some light on this
incident, but from what we gather from information, sofar made
available, here are some distinct questions which should be
raised: