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Olmert's surprising comments come a week after
the incoming U.S. secretary of defense, Robert Gates, shocked
observers when he said that Israel possessed nuclear arms, before
a Congressional confirmation panel. The incoming defense secretary
took this another step: He made it clear that "no one can
promise that Iran will not use nuclear weapons against Israel."
Could this indicate that the new Bush administration strategic
policy has washed its hands of responsibility for stopping Iran
nuking Israel (or anyone else, in the region, for that matter);and
that in a future nuclear confrontation, the United States will
stand aside and have Israel fend for itself?. If implemented,
such a strategy could have devastating consequences for Israel's
strategic posture and deterrence against Islamic fundamentalist
rogue states in the Middle East and especially extremist Iran.
Unidentified political sources, close to the prime minister's
office, offered the view that Israel cannot afford to leave
Robert Gates’ assertion last week, that no one can guarantee
Iran will not use a nuclear bomb to attack Israel unanswered-
hinting that Olmert's strange revelation could have been intentional,
in an effort trying to redress Robert Gate's dubious allegation.
Since the Sixties, when Israel is considered to have begun
its nuclear program, all presiding Governments have never confirmed
possession of nuclear weapons. It remained an open secret in
a sceptic world, and especially the highly suspicious Middle
East, even following the embarrassing disclosure, when Mordechai
Vanunu spilled Israel's nuclear secrets, some 20 years ago.
Israel's traditional caution towards its nuclear posture is
not unique. All nuclear states maintain a veil of secrecy over
their nuclear weapons posture, weapons stockpile, and technological
and operational infrastructure. Many details of Israel's nuclear
weapons program and its delivery systems have so far remained
uncertain and highly speculative. Israel has long maintained
that "it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons
into the Middle East". This declaration was adopted and
carefully maintained by all Israeli leaderships and accepted
by its ally, the USA, as a strategy of ambiguity, avoiding the
need for any formal declaration on the status of Israel's nuclear
weapons program.
Strategic ambiguity, or Opacity, has served Israel's nuclear
policy well and so far has no alternative, defense analysts
urge. This code of silence may seem an anomaly in a political
culture characterized by a normally open public debate, icluding
recently on some of the most sensitive defense issues, which
were hitherto regarded top secret. Thus, it is only natural
that people may ask themselves, following PM Olmert's apparently
bungling controversial public slip, if the near fifty year ambiguity
should last or be replaced by new national strategy. This argument
could become substantive only if adequate preparations in a
change of strategic policy be held at the highest political
and defense authority level, weighing all pro's and con's of
this delicate issue to Israel's defensive posture. In-depth
consultations should also follow with Israel's closest allies,
primarily, the United States, which must be made part and parcel
of any decision.
Finally, if Israel wishes to enhance its deteriorating strategic
deterrence in the region, following its questionable performance
during Lebanon last summer, there must be more subtle ways found
to achieve this. For example, veteran politician Shimon Peres
recently hinted in an interview, that should Iran's President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continue to threaten Israel's existence,
there are ways to have Tehran pay the heaviest consequences.
A similar expression was made by US Senator Hillary Clinton
at the Saban conference only last week. Both leaders were carefully
avoiding going into details, as to who, or how this deterrence
would be implemented. Israeli politicians, including its prime
minister would do well, to continue the traditional strategy
of ambiguity, until an in-depth and wide ranging study be convened
at the highest professional authority in order to decide if
and when such a change should take place.
Note: A new analysis assessing the regional implications of
New Nuclear Programs in the Middle East will follow in tomorrow's
Defense Update analysis section
Read David Eshel's past commentary here |
